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Abstract. Astroturfing, i.e., the fabrication of public discourse by pri-
vate or state-controlled sponsors via the creation of fake online accounts,
has become incredibly widespread in recent years. It gives a dispropor-
tionally strong voice to wealthy and technology-savvy actors, permits
targeted attacks on public forums and could in the long run harm the
trust users have in the internet as a communication platform.
Countering these efforts without deanonymising the participants has not
yet proven effective; however, we can raise the cost of astroturfing. Fol-
lowing the principle ‘one person, one voice’, we introduce TrollThrottle, a
protocol that limits the number of comments a single person can post on
participating websites. Using direct anonymous attestation and a pub-
lic ledger, the user is free to choose any nickname, but the number of
comments is aggregated over all posts on all websites, no matter which
nickname was used. We demonstrate the deployability of TrollThrottle
by retrofitting it to the popular news aggregator website Reddit and by
evaluating the cost of deployment for the scenario of a national news-
paper (168k comments per day), an international newspaper (268k c/d)
and Reddit itself (4.9M c/d).
1 Introduction
Astroturfing describes the practice of masking the sponsor of a message in order
to give it the credibility of a message that originates from ‘grassroots’ partic-
ipants (hence the name). Classic astroturfing involves paid agents fabricating
false public opinion surroundings, e.g., some product. The anonymity of the
cyberspace makes astroturfing very inexpensive; now, it can even be mecha-
nised [36]. This form of astroturfing, also called ‘cyberturfing’, is a Sybil at-
tack that exploits a useful, but sometimes fallible heuristic strategy in human
cognition: roughly speaking, the more people claim something, the improved
judgement of credibility [53, 54]. In the wake of the 2016 US elections, Twit-
ter identified, ‘3,814 [..] accounts’ that could be linked to the Internet Re-
search Agency (IRA), a purported Russian ‘troll factory’. These accounts ‘posted
175,993 Tweets, approximately 8.4% of which were election-related’ [70], which
is likely only a fraction of the overall activity. This influence comes at a modest
price, as the IRA had a $1.25M budget in the run-up to the 2016 presidential
election [4] and only 90 members of staff producing comments [28].
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The everyday political discourse has also suffered. Many newspapers have
succumbed under the weight of moderation, e.g., the New York Times [35].
Some newspapers decided to move discussion to social media [74], where they
only moderate a couple of stories each day and leave out sensitive topics such
as migration altogether [63]. Kumar et. al. show that many popular news pages
have hundreds of active sock puppets, i.e., accounts controlled by individuals
with at least one other account [52]. The New York Times, one of the largest
newspapers worldwide, has put serious effort and technological skills into moder-
ating discussion, but ultimately, they had to give up. In mid-2017, they reported
how they employ modern text analysis techniques to cluster similar comments
and moderate them in one go. At that point in time, they had 12 members of
staff dedicated to moderation, handling a daily average of 12,000 comments [56].
Despite the effort and expertise put into this, they had to give up three months
later, deactivating the commenting function on controversial topics [35].
In this paper, we propose a cryptographic protocol that permits throttling
the number of comments that a single user can post on all participating websites
in total. The goal is raising the cost of astroturfing: if the threshold is τ , the cost
of posting n comments is the cost of acquiring dnτ e identities, be it by employing
personnel, by bribery or by identity theft. Our proposal retains the anonymity
of users and provides accountability for censorship, i.e., if a user believes her
comment ought to appear on the website, she can provide evidence that can be
evaluated by the public to confirm misbehaviour on the part of the website. We
took care to explicitly devise a clear system of incentives for all participating
parties. Part of this system is a pseudo-random audit process to ensure honest
behaviour, which we have formally verified.
We show that this protocol, TrollThrottle, can be retrofitted to existing web-
sites. We set up a forum4 on Reddit that demonstrates our proposal. We also
compute the additional cost of operation incurred by our protocol by simulat-
ing user interaction for three real-life scenarios: an international newspaper, a
nationwide publication and all comments posted on Reddit in one day. In the
newspaper case, the computational overhead incurs a cost of about $1.20; for
the whole of Reddit, $3.60 is sufficient.
As a by-product and second contribution, we extend the notion of direct
anonymous attestation (DAA) by proposing two features with applications out-
side our protocol. Both are already supported by an existing DAA scheme by
Brickell and Li [24]. First, updatability, which means that the issuer can non-
interactively update the users’ credentials. This allows for easy key rollover in the
mobile setting and for implicit revocation of credentials by not updating them
(old credentials invalidated). Second, instant linkability, which means that each
signature contains a message-independent pseudonym that determines whether
two signatures can be linked. This allows to efficiently determine whether a
signature can be linked to any existing signature within a given set.
4 https://old.reddit.com/r/trollthrottle/
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Paper structure: We first define the problem and outline the approach in Sec-
tion 2. In Section 3, we define the protocol in terms of a set of cryptographic
algorithms, which we analyse for security in Section B. In Section 4, we consider
caveats of implementing this system that are not covered in the cryptographic
model: the incentive structure for the participants, who performs verification,
etc. We evaluate our proposal (Section 5) and consider its impact on society
(Section D). We conclude after discussing limitations (Section 6) and the related
work (Section 7).
2 TrollThrottle
Despite text analysis techniques that can facilitate moderation, e.g., cluster-
ing [56], many local and international newspaper websites gave up on moder-
ating and disabled commenting sections [35, 74]. Even if troll detection could
be automated, e.g., via machine learning, as soon as the detection algorithm
becomes available to attackers, numerous techniques permit the creation of ad-
versarial examples [55] to evade classifiers. Fundamentally, astroturfing does not
even rely on automated content generation and can be conducted by paid au-
thors in countries with low labour cost: e.g., the so-called 50-cent party, a group
of propagandists sponsored by China, was named after the remuneration they
receive per comment [58].
Our approach is orthogonal to detection by content. If we can limit the num-
ber of messages to a certain threshold τ that each physical person can send
per day, bots become largely useless, and troll farms need to pay, bribe or steal
identities from sufficiently many actual people to send messages in their name.
Besides raising the cost, this also raises the probability of detecting larger oper-
ations. This approach comes at a cost for honest users, as it imposes a bound
on power users, too. We will discuss this issue in-depth in Section D.
Problem statement: We want to establish a system that serves a set of websites
W1 to Wn and that, for each user U , provides the following guarantees:
I If the number of messages a user posts to any of the websites exceeds τ , all
subsequent messages should be discarded.
II A user is free to choose a virtual identity of her choice for any comment. Her
comments are unlinkable, even if one or more websites conspire against her.
III A website should be accountable for censorship: should it choose not to
display a comment, the user is able to provide a piece of verifiable evidence
for the public that this comment was withheld, without revealing her identity.
IV The trust placed in the organisation running the system should be limited.
For each party in the system, there should be a clear incentive to participate.
We built our approach on direct anonymous attestation (DAA [21]). In DAA,
an issuing party distributes membership credentials to signers (in our case users)
that it considers legitimate. Each signer can prove membership by signing data:
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Fig. 1: Approach
a valid DAA signature guarantees that a valid signer signed this data, but does
not reveal the signer’s identity. DAA schemes can also be seen as group signature
schemes that prevent the issuing party to identify the signer of the message, a
feature known as opening.
To avoid a single point of trust, the identification of the user is not only a
matter of the issuer, who is likely to be the provider of this service. Instead, an
agreed upon set of verifiers establishes the legitimacy of users, i.e., that they are
real people and that they have not received a DAA key before. We will discuss
how the issuer and the verifiers keep each other honest in Section E.1. To provide
accountability, a public ledger keeps records about the comments that websites
ought to publish.
Thus, the following parties cooperate in TrollThrottle: an issuer I, who issues
DAA keys, a set of verifiers V , who verify the users’ identities, a set of users U ,
who create DAA signatures of their comments, a public append-only ledger L,
who records these signatures, and a set of websites, who verify these signatures
and are bound to publish comments whose signatures exist on the ledger.
In DAA, a signature can be created and verified with respect to a so-called
basename. Signatures created by the same user with the same basename can
be linked. This is the key feature to achieve throttling. Within a commenting
period t, e.g., a day, only signatures with a basename of the form (t, seq) are
accepted, where seq is a sequence number between 1 and the desired threshold
τ . If a user signs two messages with the same basename, they can be linked and
discarded by the website. Hence a user can create at most τ signatures that are
unlinkable to each other. A valid DAA signature assures the website that a valid
user signed this comment, but neither the website, nor the issuer or the verifier
learns who created the comment, or which other comments they created.
By storing the signatures on the ledger L, the websites (a) can enforce a
global bound, and (b) provide accountability for censorship by promising to
represent all comments addressed to this website that appear in the ledger. If a
website does not publish a user’s comment, it must have sufficient grounds for
censorship.
We build on Brickell and Li’s DAA scheme [24] for its efficiency, but extend
it with various features to make TrollThrottle more efficient (see Appendix A),
more secure (Section 3), more practical (Section 4), and more resistant against
compromise (Section 4).
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We assume the issuer I is known to all users and websites; the verifiers V
are known to the issuer and all websites; and the public ledger L is known to all
participants in the protocol. The ledger can be implemented using a consensus
mechanism between the websites and some trusted representatives of civil society
(e.g., via Tendermint [42] or PBFT [29]) or open consensus mechanisms like
blockchains. We will formalise our approach in terms of PPT algorithms and an
interactive protocol.
V Definition 1 (Accountable commenting scheme). An accountable com-
menting scheme consists of a tuple of algorithms (Setup, KeyGen, Comment,
Verify, Claim, VerifyClaim) and an interactive protocol (Join− Issue). The algo-
rithms and the protocol are specified as follows.
Setup(1λ) models the generation of a setup parameter ρ used by all partici-
pants from the security parameter 1λ. This parameter is an implicit argument for
the other algorithms, but we omit it for brevity. The issuer I invokes KeyGen(ρ)
to generate its secret key sk I and public key pk I from this parameter.
The issuing procedure 〈Join(pk I,U ) ↔ Issue(sk I, ver,U )〉 is an interactive
protocol between I and a new user (identified with U ) that has not registered
so far. At the end of the protocol, the user receives a credential credU and a
secret key skU . For now, we abstract away from the verifiers by giving the issuer
access to a read-only database ver such that ver[V,U ] ∈ {0, 1} is 1 iff the verifier
V confirms the identity of a user. In Section 4, we present and verify a protocol
to implement and audit this verification step.
The commenting procedure is split into four PPT algorithms, Comment for
U to generate comments that she sends to the ledger, Verify for W to verify that
a comment on the ledger should be displayed, Claim for U to generate a claim
that a valid comment on the ledger ought to be published, and VerifyClaim for
the public to verify that said claim is valid.
Comment(pk I, skU , credU , dom,m) is executed by U , who knows the issuer’s
public key pk I, its own secret key skU and credentials credU . U chooses a base-
name dom ∈ {0, 1}∗ and a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗ and obtains a signed comment
γ and a pseudonym nym, both of which she stores on the ledger. The basename
determines a user’s nym, so that anyone can check whether two comments were
submitted with the same basename by checking their respective nyms for equal-
ity. This is a key feature: in TrollThrottle, all basenames have to be of the form
〈t, i〉 for a commenting period t and an integer i ∈ {1, . . . , τ }. Hence there are
at most τ unique basenames within t, and thus at most τ nyms per skU and t.
Verify(pk I,nym, dom,m, γ) can be computed by any website that has ac-
cess to the issuer’s public key pk I, the comment on the ledger γ, pseudonym
nym, domain dom (which can be determined by trial and error) and a mes-
sage m ∈ {0, 1}∗ received from the user. If the output is 1 and γ is valid
w.r.t. m, the website W must display m. If W fails to do that, the user com-
putes Claim(pk I, skU , credU , dom,m, γ) on the same data as before. The output
evidence can be publicly verified using the VerifyClaim(pk I, dom,m, γ, evidence)
algorithm. It outputs 1 iff evidence and the ledger entry γ prove that m ought
to be displayed during the commenting period indicated by dom.
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3 Protocol definition
Before we present TrollThrottle as an instance of an accountable commenting
scheme, we introduce the necessary cryptographic notions.
We follow the DAA definition proposed in [24]. A DAA scheme consists of
four PPT algorithms (SetupDAA,SignDAA,VerifyDAA, LinkDAA) and an interactive
protocol (Join− IssueDAA), between parties: an issuer I, a verifier V and a signer
S. In our case, the websites take the role of the verifiers, and the users the role
of the signer.
SetupDAA(1
λ) is run by I; based on the security parameter 1λ, it computes the
issuer’s secret key sk I and public key pk I , including global public parameters.
Join− IssueDAA is an interactive protocol between I and S to provide credentials
issued by I to S. It consists of sub-algorithms JoinDAA and IssueDAA. S executes
JoinDAA(pk I , skS) on input pk I and skS to obtain the commitment com.
5 I exe-
cutes IssueDAA(sk I , com) to create a credential credS that is associated with skS
and sent to S. Note the key of S remains hidden from I.
SignDAA(skS , credS , dom,m) is executed by S to create a signature σ for
a message m w.r.t. a basename dom, 6 which is optionally provided by V . If
dom 6= ⊥, signatures created by the same signer can be linked.
VerifyDAA(pk I ,m, dom, σ,RL) is a deterministic algorithm run by V on a
messagem, a basename dom, a signature σ, and a revocation list RL to determine
if a signature σ is valid. In [24], I stores revoked secret keys in the revocation
list RL; signatures created with a revoked secret key are not valid.
LinkDAA(σ0, σ1) is a deterministic algorithm that determines with overwhelm-
ing probability whether signatures σ0 and σ1 were created by the same signer
with the same basename dom 6= ⊥. It outputs 1 if the signatures are linked, 0
for unlinked and ⊥ for invalid ones.
DAA features Brickell and Li’s DAA scheme [24] has the following security
properties (formally stated in Appendix F).
Correctness: if an honest signer’s secret key is not in the revocation list
RL, then, with overwhelming probability, signatures created by the signer are
accepted and correctly linked by an honest verifier.
User-controlled-anonymity: a PPT adversary has a negligible advantage over
guessing in a game where she has to distinguish whether two given signatures
associated with different basenames were created by the same signer or two
different signers.
5 We slightly alter the original definition and assume that instead of sampling this key
inside the algorithm, S provides the key as an input.
6 In the original definition, SignDAA also takes as input a nonce nV , which the signature
verifier provides to prove freshness of the message. Brickell and Li make this nonce
explicit but it can be part of the signed message. What’s more, we will not make use
of such a nonce in our system and assume that if freshness of a signature is required
then this nonce will be part of the signed message.
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User-controlled-traceability: no PPT adversary can forge a non-traceable yet
valid signature with dom 6= ⊥7 without knowing the secret key that was used to
create the signature, or if her key is in the revocation list RL.
We add the following property (formally stated in Appendix A):
Instant-linkability There is a deterministic poly-time algorithm NymGen s.t.
NymGen(skS , dom) generates a nym that is otherwise contained in the signature,
and two nyms are equal iff the corresponding signatures are linkable.
Zero-knowledge The user creates non-interactive proofs of knowledge to show
that her key was honestly generated. We highlight the notation here and refer to
Appendix C.1 for the full security definitions. Let R be an efficiently computable
binary relation. For (x,w) ∈ R, we call x a statement and w a witness. Moreover,
LR denotes the language consisting of statements in R, i.e., LR = {x | ∃w :
(x,w) ∈ R}.
Definition 2. A non-interactive proof of knowledge system Π consists of the
following three algorithms (Setup,CreateProof,VerifyProof).
Setup(1λ): on input security parameter 1λ, this algorithm outputs a common
reference string ρ.
CreateProof(ρ, x, w): on input common reference string ρ, statement x and wit-
ness w; this algorithm outputs a proof pi.
VerifyProof(ρ, x, pi): on input common reference string ρ, statement x and proof
pi; this algorithm outputs either 1 or 0.
TrollThrottle We will now present TrollThrottle in terms of an accountable
commenting scheme (see Def. 1). Besides an instantly linkable DAA scheme,
we assume a collision-resistant hash function h and a non-interactive proof of
knowledge system for the relation:
((com, pk I,DAA), (skS,DAA)) ∈ RJoin ⇐⇒ com ←$ JoinDAA(pk I,DAA, skS,DAA).
We assume that the witness for the statement (com, pk I,DAA) contains the ran-
dom coins used in JoinDAA.
Definition 3. TrollThrottle Protocol
Setup(1λ) - compute the parameters for the zero-knowledge proof of knowledge
ρJoin ←$ SetupZK(1λ) and output ρ = (1λ, ρJoin).
KeyGen(ρ) - execute (pk I,DAA, sk I,DAA) ←$ SetupDAA(1λ), set and return pk I =
pk I,DAA and sk I = (pk I,DAA, sk I,DAA).
Join(pk I, skU ,U ) - let pk I = pk I,DAA and skU = skS,DAA. Run com←$ JoinDAA(pk I,DAA, skS,DAA)
and compute proof ΠJoin = CreateProof(ρJoin, (com, pk I,DAA), skS,DAA). Send
(com, ΠJoin) to the issuer and receive credU . Return (credU , skU ).
7 Note that basenames in TrollThrottle are always different from ⊥, see Section 3.
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Issue(sk I, ver,U ) - parse sk I = (pk I,DAA, sk I,DAA). Receive (com, ΠJoin) from the
User. Abort if the proof is invalid, i.e., VerifyProof(ρJoin, (com, pk I,DAA), ΠJoin) =
0. Otherwise, execute the IssueDAA protocol with input (com, sk I,DAA), receiv-
ing credentials credU . Send credU to the user.
Comment(pk I, skU , credU , dom,m) - set and return γ = (σ,nym, dom, h(m))
where σ ←$ SignDAA(skU , credU , dom, h(m)) and nym ←$ NymGen(skU , dom) =
NymExtract(σ).
Verify(pk I,nym, dom,m, γ) - Parse γ = (σ,nym, dom, h
∗) and pk I = pk I,DAA.
Output 1 iff
– VerifyDAA(pk I,DAA, h
∗, dom, σ, RL∅) = 1 and h(m) = h∗,
– NymExtract(σ) = nym, and
– VerifyBsn(σ, dom) = 1.
Claim(pk I, skU , credU , dom,m, γ) - return evidence = γ.
VerifyClaim(pk I, dom,m, γ, evidence) - Parse γ = (σ,nym, dom, h) and output 1
iff Verify(pk I,nym, dom,m, γ) = 1.
The algorithms Setup and KeyGen generate the issuer’s DAA keys and param-
eters for the non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge for the relation
RJoin. The Join− Issue protocol closely resembles the Join− IssueDAA protocol of
the DAA scheme with two main differences. Firstly, the user provides her secret
key as input to the Join algorithm. This is for practical reasons: in Section 4, we
explain how this key can be recomputed from a pair of login and password using
a key derivation function when a user switches machines. The second difference
is the ΠJoin proof created by the user to ensure honestly generated secret keys
and allow the security reduction to extract secret keys generated by the adver-
sary. We remark that during the Join− Issue protocol, the user communicates
with a publicly known verifier who validates her identity and confirms it to I.
In Section 4, we present a protocol for obtaining this confirmation and running
a pseudo-probabilistic audit of V by I.
Comment creates the information that U stores on the ledger, consisting
of the signed comment γ and pseudonym nym. To provide accountability for
censorship, U sends the signature to the ledger, which notifies the website W .
At this point, W must publish the comment γ = (σ,nym, dom,m) as long as
the signature σ, message and dom are deemed valid, and nym appears exactly
once on the ledger.
With the validity requirement on the basename dom and the ability to detect
repeated basenames in the ledger, we can easily implement the desired throttling
mechanism. Let τ be a threshold for some time frame (e.g., a day) and let t mark
the current period. Then, a valid dom is of the form (t, seq) with seq ∈ {1, . . . , t}.
The sequence number seq in dom is allowed to arrive out-of-order, but it cannot
be larger than τ . The throttling is ensured because there exist only τ valid
basenames per commenting period and thus only τ valid nym per (skU , dom).
If W refuses to publish the comment, then U can use Claim to claim cen-
sorship and provide the entry on the ledger γ and m as evidence to the public
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that m ought to be displayed. The public checks the same conditions that W
should have applied. Part of this check is to interpret a common agreement for
moderation, which we discuss in more detail in Section 4, but do not model
explicitly. We show the security of this protocol in the cryptographic model, see
Appendix B.
4 Practical implementation
A deployable system needs more than just a cryptographic specification, but
a system of incentives and checks. First, we discuss what methods for identity
verification are available. We detail how to identity verification can be deferred to
the verifiers and misbehaviour can be detected using pseudo-probabilistic audits.
A realistic system also has to deal with revocation, which we solve by exploiting
a novel property called updatability. Finally, we discuss questions related to the
end user: how moderation is handled and where to store credentials. Table 1
summarises the protocol components and their security analysis.
Identity providers The verifiers need to attest that only real people receive dig-
ital identities and each person obtains only one. We discuss multiple competing
solutions to this problem, none perfect by itself. In combination, however, they
cover a fair share of the users for our primary target, news websites.
Identity verification services (IVS): Banks, insurers and other online-only
services already rely on so-called identity verification services, e.g., to comply
with banking or anti-money laundering regulations. Usually, IVS providers ver-
ify the authenticity of claims using physical identity documents, authoritative
sources, or by performing ID checks via video chat or post-ID. McKinsey antic-
ipates the market for IVS to reach $16B-20B by 2022 [72]. The business model
of these companies revolves around their trustworthiness.
Subscriber lists: Newspaper websites are the main targets of our proposal,
because of their political and societal relevance and the moderation cost they are
currently facing. It is in their interest to provide easy access to their subscribers.
Insofar as bills are being paid, they do have some assurance of the identity of
their subscribers, so they can use their existing relationship to bootstrap the
system by giving access to their customers right away.
components security analysis
base protocol cryptographic proof (Appendix B)
encrypted ledger strictly weakens the attacker
identity verification formally verified (Appendix 4)
revocation simple hybrid argument using Appendix F
extended protocol cryptographic proof (Appendix C)
storing credentials trivial modification
Table 1: Overview: security analysis.
10 Esiyok I., Hanzlik L., Ku¨nnemann R., Budde L.M and Backes M.
name symbol purpose typical duration
epoch te implicit revocation one week
billing period tb billing one month
commenting period t throttling one day
Table 2: Time periods used in protocol.
Biometric passports and identification documents: Biometric passports
are traditional passports that have an embedded electronic microprocessor chip
containing information for authenticating the identity of the passport holder.
The chip was introduced to enable additional protection against counterfeiting
and identity theft. This authentication process can be performed locally (as
part of e.g., border control) or against a remote server. Biometric passports
are standardised by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) [46]
and issued by around 150 countries [37]. More importantly, even many electronic
identification documents are supporting this standard, e.g., the German eID [25].
Our system can easily leverage this infrastructure to authenticate users. Of
course, we need to assume that governments are issuing those documents hon-
estly, however, large-scale fraud would have serious repercussions for the issuing
government.
These methods can be combined: even if somebody is neither a subscriber
of a newspaper nor the owner of a digital passport, they still have the option of
identifying to the IVS. We note that a natural person could use two methods
(e.g., IVS and subscriber list) to obtain two DAA credentials and thus effectively
double her threshold. As we provide a method for revocation (see Section 4), the
verifiers can run private set-intersection protocols (see [62] for an overview) and
revoke parties in the intersection.
Encrypting comments on the ledger We distinguish a billing period tb that is dis-
tinct from the commenting period t (see Table 2). Assume a CCA-secure public
key encryption scheme (KGenc, enc, dec), a collision-resistant hash function h and
a standard existentially unforgeable digital signature scheme (KGsig, sig, ver). We
apply the accountable commenting scheme from Def. 3. The output of Comment
is encrypted with a public key pkW ,tb distributed to all websites participating
in the current billing period tb. Claims need to include the randomness used to
encrypt. See Fig. 2 for the complete message flow.
Deferring identity verification with pseudo-probabilistic auditing Our security
model in Appendix B abstracts away from the communication between verifier
and issuer. We propose a protocol to implement this step and formally verify
it in the symbolic setting, which is better suited for reasoning about complex
interactions. The protocol (Fig. 3) improves privacy by hiding the identity ver-
ification process from the issuer and improves accountability by providing a
pseudo-random audit.
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0. U can restore skU from login and pw ,
and download h(login), cred te from L:
skU ··= kdf (login, pw)
L −→ U : {h(login), cred te}
1. U computes the basename from date and sequence:
dom ··= (t, seq)
2. U computes the nym from skU and dom:
nym ··= NymGen(skU , dom))
3. U signs the hash of his comment:
σ ··= Sign(skU , cred , dom, h(m),W )
4. U encrypts σ, attaches metadata and sends it to L:
γ ··= {enc(pkW ,tb , (σ,nym); r), h(m),W, dom}
U −→ L : γ
5. L notifies W and U sends the raw comment to W :
L −→W : γ
U −→W : m
6. W decrypts γ and verifies the following:
σ valid, VerifyBsn(σ, dom) = 1, seq ≤ τ , m acceptable.
7. W queries L with nym:
nym ··= NymExtract(σ)
W −→ L : nym
8. W publishes m if nym fresh and m acceptable.
9. U claims censorship to public, if m not published:
claimU ··= {σ,nym, r,m}
U −→ public : claimU
Fig. 2: Message flow for commenting. Note that in step 0, the user’s secret DAA
key is restored using a password, see Section 4, and that entries in the ledger are
encrypted, see Section E.1. Furthermore, to save space on the ledger, we identify
the comment m by its hash.
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1. U creates a secure channel with I, with session id sid :
I −→ U : sid
2. U chooses login, pw and random rU , sends to I:
rU ←$ {0, 1}
U −→ I : login, h(rU , nbd, 1)
3. I chooses random nonce rI , creates a commitment cI ,
signs it and sends it to U :
rI ←$ {0, 1}
cI ··= h(rI , sid, h(rU , nbd, 1))
I −→ U : sig(skI , cI)
4. U creates a secret key from his login and pw :
skU ··= kdf (login, pw)
5. U creates a secure channel with V and sends:
U −→ V : {nbd, cI , rU , sig(skI , cI)}
6. V verifies U ’s identity with evidence E,
signs the commitment and sends it to U :
ψ ··= sig(skV , cI)
V −→ U : ψ
7. U recreates the secure session with the previous sid ,
and sends the commitment (signed by V ) to I:
U −→ I : ψ
** U and I run Join− Issue protocol (Fig. 4)
** I use ψ to start auditing with V (Fig. 5)
Fig. 3: Identity verification protocol specification
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We assume a collision-resistant one-way hash function h to instantiate a
binding commitment scheme. When a user wants to register, the website directs
her to the issuer. They run an authentication protocol akin to the ASW protocol
for fair exchange [15] where, in the end, U gets V ’s signature on a commitment
cI generated by I. Only with this signature, the issuer runs the Join− Issue
procedure from Def. 3 (repeated in Fig. 4 for completeness). Note that the ledger
distributes the issuer’s public key and public parameters. In Section 4, we explain
a revocation mechanism that is based on updating the issuer’s public key every
epoch and publishing the fresh key in the ledger. U also makes use of the ledger
by storing its credentials in case it needs to recover its state (see Section 4).
1. U downloads pkI from L :
L −→ U : pkI
2. U and I run Join− IssueDAA proto. using skU and
pkI for epoch te, and U gains cred te and wte .
3. U inserts h(login) and cred te into L :
U −→ L : h(login), cred te
4. I inserts h(login) and wte into L :
I −→ L : h(login),wte
Fig. 4: Join− Issue protocol specification
After verification, I may trigger a pseudo-random audit by sending the pre-
viously hidden values sid , rI in the commitment cI of the identity verification
protocol to V (see Fig. 5). If the hash of these values matches the hash of V ’s
signed commitments, an audit is triggered. If we consider a random oracle in
place of the hash function, the probability of an audit is Pr[audit] = 2−L, where
L is the number of bits both parties compare. L is agreed upon in advance, to de-
fine this probability. Since the nonce rI has been revealed to V before, I cannot
modify the second hash (s′) to avoid audit. As the digital signature scheme is
existentially unforgeable, I cannot fabricate a valid signature to raise the prob-
ability of an audit and to learn something about U . If the session is chosen for
audit, V has to hand over the evidence {E} it collected for identification — this
is a standard procedure for IVS. If V fails to comply, then I can publish a claim
and the public can determine whether to audit V .
Presuming that I is honest, the probability that colluding U and V can
create n usable fake identities is thus bound by (1− Pr[audit])n + negl(λ) for
some negligible function negl(λ).
The auditing protocol is very simple cryptographically, but has many pos-
sible message interleaving. It is well known that pen-and-paper proofs for such
protocols are not only tedious, but also prone to errors. We analyse the proto-
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** I and V are principals.
1. I sends sid and rI to V :
I −→ V : {sid, rI}
2. I and V both calculate two hashes:
s ··= h(ri, sid, 2)
s′ ··= h(ψ)
3. Both compare the first L bits of these two hashes:
s|0L = s′|0L
4. If the session is chosen for audit, V sends E to I:
V −→ I : E
5. If V fails to comply, I can publish a claim:
claimI ··= {rI , sid, h(rU ,nbd , 1), ψ}
I −→ public : claimI
6. The public audits V , V proves it acted in good faith:
V −→ public : {rU , nbd, E}
7. The public gives the verdict.
Fig. 5: Auditing protocol specification
col in the symbolic model, using the SAPIC process calculus [51] and Tamarin
protocol verifier [64]. We formally verify that:
1. Whenever I accepts to run the Join− Issue protocol with a user, V has
validated her identity, unless I or V are dishonest.
2. When determining the need for an audit, neither a dishonest I, nor a dis-
honest V can predict the value of the other party, unless both are dishonest.
Therefore, they cannot trigger or avoid the audit.
3. If the public accepts a claim, then V did indeed receive the values rI and sid
and send out ψ (unless V is dishonest and tricks itself into the obligation of
an audit). As these values determine both hashes, the public can now decide
if an audit was justified.
The verification takes about 10 sec on a 3.1 GHz Intel Core i7 and 16 GB
RAM computer. 8
Revocation In case U runs the identification protocol a second time with a
different V , or simply forgets her password and needs to re-identify, her previous
DAA key skU ,DAA needs to be revoked. But how can U revoke her DAA key if
she forgets her password? We circumvent this problem by implicit revocation:
DAA keys are short-lived by default, but the system can issue new keys without
interacting with the user. Keys that are not issued are thus implicitly revoked
by the end of their lifetime, which we call the epoch (see Fig. 2).
8 See Appendix E for the model code.
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** I, V and L are principals.
1. I announces new epoch t′e and updates her pkI,t′e :
I −→ L : t′e
2. I asks all V s, to report all valid logins to be updated :
V −→ I : sig(skV , (’update’, cI))
3. I obtains update message u for all valid logins from L :
L −→ I : h(login, u)
4. I creates new credentials for each login :
cred t′e
··= IssuerDAA(skI , pkI , u)
5. I stores new credentials for each login in L :
I −→ L : h(login, cred t′e , t′e)
Fig. 6: Certificate update protocol specification
At the start of each epoch te, I defines a new public key pk I,t′e which is chosen
so that I can recompute all credentials cred t′e for the new epoch by itself (see
Fig. 6). At this point, only those DAA keys remain valid, for which such a cred
is computed, all others are implicitly revoked. If a user forgets her password, she
reports to the verifier, who confirms (by means of the commitment cI) that her
old key is invalidated. Starting from the next epoch, she can use her new key. To
allow for such mechanism, the DAA scheme has to be structured in a way that
I can update her public key and all users ’credentials without any interaction.
Definition 4 (Updateable DAA scheme).
A DAA scheme is updateable if:
1. SetupDAA can be divided into Setup1 and Setup2, s.t.:
– Setup1(1
λ), outputs a persistent group public key gpk1
– Setup2(1
λ, gpk1) outputs an ephemeral group public key gpk2 and a secret
key skS, where pk I = (gpk1, gpk2).
2. The Join− IssueDAA protocol consists of two steps UserDAA and IssuerDAA, s.t.:
– UserDAA(gpk1, skS) outputs an update u,
– IssuerDAA takes pk I , u and sk I as inputs and outputs valid credentials
credS for secret key skS w.r.t. the new pk I .
3. Setup1 uses only public coins to generate gpk1, i.e., there are no secrets re-
quired to generate gpk1 and giving those coins to the adversary only negligibly
increases its advantage in the user-controlled anonymity and traceability ex-
periments.
Brickell and Li’s scheme with a minor modification possess these features
(see Appendix F for a formal proof).
Updatability is interesting on its own: it allows for regular, non-interactive
key rollovers in DAA. I can create each user’s credential offline, so the user can
fetch this credential (in encrypted form) at later point, even if I is offline.
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Holding the issuer accountable In TrollThrottle, a corrupt issuer and verifier can
collude to introduce arbitrarily many valid credentials into the system. This form
of Sybil attack is difficult to counter while retaining the user’s privacy: Without
trust in either the verifiers or the issuer, the only way of determining whether a
user is legitimate is to have another entity (e.g., the websites, or the public) check
this identity — otherwise, the adversary controls all parties involved. Even if
done in a pseudo-random manner similar to the auditing procedure in Section 4,
the loss of individual privacy would be considerable.
In Appendix C we present the extended TrollThrottle protocol to mitigate
this issue to the extent possible. Here, for every user that joins, a genesis block
is added to the ledger. This block is signed by the verifier, which allows the
public to tell how many credentials were validated by each verifier. Large-scale
fraud could thus be detected through an unusual number of participants coming
from a single verifier. This information is public and can be computed by any
participant at any time.
During the commenting phase, U downloads a subset of genesis tuples9 and
computes a zero-knowledge proof that her genesis tuple is part of this set. She
includes this proof along with the time point at which she queried the list in her
DAA signature. In Appendix C.5, we show that for Brickell and Li’s scheme [24],
we can instantiate a non-interactive proof of knowledge system with proofs that
are logarithmic in the number of genesis tuples in the ledger. We show that,
in addition to the security properties in Appendix B, no adversary can create
comments that cannot be attributed.
Moderation News websites need to moderate comments (see step 8 in Fig. 2).
This decision is ultimately a human decision, but it should be based on a binding
agreement between the participating websites, and in compliance with the laws
that apply to them. When U claims censorship, the public has to judge based
on the agreement and the content of m.
Storing credentials By default, a cookie or browser plugin may store the creden-
tials, however, many users expect a system to work similarly to a third-party
website, where they can log in from a computer of their choice. We, therefore,
allow users to restore their identities, by making the users’ secret keys e.g., skU
derivable from their login and password chosen by themselves in the identification
process. Hence, we assume there exists an efficiently computable key-derivation
function kdf [49] that maps to the space of secret keys. Such a function exists
for the scheme we use, where the secret key is just an element in Z∗q .
The secret key skU can be recomputed by applying the key-derivation func-
tion to login and password, while the DAA credentials cred can be recovered
from the ledger by querying with the hash of her login. Note that the login
should not identify the user on other platforms, otherwise an attacker can use it
to check if the user is participating in TrollThrottle. The last value of seq can be
9 To achieve, e.g., anonymity among 100 users, about 49 KB of data is downloaded
once per commenting period.
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Fig. 7: Screenshot of Reddit deployment, for identity creation and commenting
scenarios, see Retrofitting subreddit
recovered by using bisection to discover the largest seq s.t. NymGen(skU , (t, seq))
is on the ledger.
5 Evaluation
We evaluate TrollThrottle in terms of how easy it is to deploy, and how much
performance overhead it incurs. To demonstrate the former, we retrofit it to an
existing website, without any modification to the server-side code — in fact,
without the website being aware of this. To demonstrate that it incurs only
modest costs, we simulate realistic traffic patterns using a recorded message
stream and measure computational overhead and latency.
Deployability We demonstrate that the protocol can be deployed easily by
retrofitting it, without any server-side changes, to Reddit.com, the most visited
news website in the world [12] and an alleged target for large-scale astroturfing
and propaganda efforts [69].
On Reddit, we created a forum as a testing ground. We implemented signa-
ture creation and verification in a JavaScript library and used a simple browser
extension [10] to load this library when entering the forum. In an actual de-
ployment, this library would be loaded via JavaScript inclusions. We point out,
18 Esiyok I., Hanzlik L., Ku¨nnemann R., Budde L.M and Backes M.
however, the known problem that there is no guarantee the website W is trans-
mitting the correct script. This is a well-known issue for all web-based services
that claim end-to-end security (e.g., ProtonMail [48]), and sometimes mitigated
by offering optional plugins (e.g., mega.co.nz). Note, though, that there was an
incident where the chrome extension itself was compromised via the Chrome web
store, which highlights the need to trust both the software developer and the
distribution mechanism [14]. We forked the Multiprecision Integer and Rational
Arithmetic Cryptographic Library (MIRACL) [8] and modified it for portability.
Then, using emscripten, we compiled this library to javascript. As this library
is widely used to implement elliptic curve cryptography and large integers, this
modified version could be of independent interest for front-end applications [7].
We use this library to implement Brickell and Li’s pairing based DAA scheme us-
ing Barreto-Naehrig (BN) [18] elliptic curve at the 128-bit security level. Further-
more, we use libsodium [6] for digital signatures used in the identity verification
protocol (based on Ed25519 with 256 bit keys), hashing (BLAKE2B), authenti-
cated public-key encryption (based on XSalsa20 stream cipher and X25519 key
exchange with 256 bit keys) and randomness generation. For key derivation,
we used PBKDF2 in Crypto-js [3] with 100 100 iterations.10 The simulation is
available in [11].
Any comment posted in this subreddit is transmitted according to the proto-
col (see Fig. 2). As the server side is not validating the comments in this instance,
this task is performed by the JS library as well. It communicates with a simple
HTTP server implementing the public ledger. Comments that do not pass are
greyed out by using a subreddit-specific stylesheet (see Fig. 7).
Performance To evaluate TrollThrottle’s performance, we compiled three realis-
tic datasets [2] to represent plausible scenarios. Our focus is on traditional news
outlets that want to establish a close relation with their readership. We thus ex-
amine two scenarios in this domain, and a third, representing an extreme case:
the entirety of Reddit, the largest website categorised as ‘News’ by Alexa [12].
Scenario I: nationwide news source Most news pages operate primarily on a
national scale. Here, traffic patterns can have sharp peaks, e.g., is the vast ma-
jority of German speakers situated in the same time zone. Using Germany as an
example, the most popular news page [13] reports a ‘clear five-figure number’ of
comments per day [57], with other pages reporting between 12k and 80k [75]. As
we have no access to comments before moderation, we simulate the traffic pat-
terns. We do so by combining the traffic of the German-speaking r/de subreddit
of sufficiently many days until we reach a volume of 168k comments.
Scenario II: international newspaper In mid-2017, just three months before they
decided to stop accepting comments out of lack of resources, the New York Times
reported 12K comments per day [56]. If we assume an exponential growth at a
rate of about 140% per year11, we estimate 398k incoming comments in January
10 Default for server-side storage of passwords in LastPass [5].
11 Extrapolated from data points in 2016 [76] and 2018 [75].
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2020. Again, we use Reddit data to retrieve realistic traffic patterns. In this case,
we collected all comments on submitted links to nytimes.com from a 24h period.
We aggregated the comments over a two-month period, from the beginning of
May to the end of June 2019, to reach 268k comments.
Scenario III: Number of comments per day on Reddit From a 10-year dataset
that includes all comments ever posted on Reddit, we pick the recent busiest day,
which is 27 June 2019 with 4 913 934 comments. As for the other datasets, we
did not filter out the comments that are marked as ‘[deleted]’, i.e., were removed
by moderators or their respective authors. They do not contain information
about their authors, but still show the request patterns that the website needs
to handle. Hence, we regarded them as one regular user.
Performance measures We focus on the performance requirements from the
perspective of the news outlet that has to serve users within a given latency and
compute the additional cost due to the new computations. To get a precise mea-
sure of the overhead incurred, our experiment only simulates the cryptographic
operations and does not display the comments or use network communication.
The computation is performed separately for the server and the client. We as-
sume the issuer is trusted and thus disregard the extension in Appendix C.
As for the other datasets, we collected the comments annotated with their
author’s nickname and the time point they were posted. The dataset is thus
a sequence of tuples (t, u,m) ordered by the time point t at which u posted
comment m. We assume each nickname corresponds to a different actual person,
thus over-approximating the effort for key generation. For each (t, u,m), we
(1) simulate the issuing protocol, if u comes out in the entire (10 years) dataset
for the first time,
(2) simulate the commenting protocol to produce a signature for the comment,
and finally
(3) simulate the server side signature verification.
Step (1) and (2) can be done in a pre-processing step, as they are computed
by the user and issuer. We measure the time for commenting (δComment) and
issuing (δIssueI and δ
Issue
U , for the issuer and the user, respectively). For step (3),
we simulate the load of the server side on a Ruby-on-Rails application with
Nginx load balancer.
Firstly, we estimated the number of cores needed to satisfy a latency re-
quirement of l = 0.1 seconds using a simple first-come-first-serve scheduler. To
determine this value, we used the following algorithm. We sampled the server
computation time δs by measuring the verification time for a random comment.
We start with one core. We compute a first-come-first-serve scheduling until
we reach a point where a comment posted at t is scheduled at t′ such that
t′ + ts < t + l. If we never reach such a point, we are done and output the
number of cores. Otherwise, we add a new core.
Secondly, we simulated the load on the server. For each point (t, u,m) in the
database, we simulate the arrival of the encrypted signature (γ,nym) resulting
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from pre-processing m, at time t + δComment + δIssueI + δ
Issue
U . We run Verify on
the signature and measure the finishing time tf , as well as the actual processing
time δVerify. We report the results in seconds for the largest dataset in Table 3.
measure mean median variance
issuing (on U)1 δIssueU 0.038 0.036 0.069
issuing (on W )1 δIssueI 0.010 0.009 0.0006
commenting2 δComment 0.036 0.032 0.0003
verification δVerify 0.021 0.018 0.0002
latency3 tf − t 0.022 0.019 0.0002
commenting
(on U)4 δCommentU 0.058 0.057 0.01
(1) over all new users.(2) computation overhead
w/ pre-computed signatures.(3) shows server-side
total processing time.(4) on 1000 samples, single-
threaded.
Table 3: Evaluation for Reddit use case (3 cores).
In Table 4, we report the number of cores needed and the cost incurred by
the computations just described, i.e., the overhead compared to normal website
operations. The number of cores to meet the latency requirement was estimated
as described above and used in the simulation. To account for the cost, we employ
the core hours metric, which is the product of the number of cores and the total
running time on the server. We take Amazon on Demand EC2 pricing [1] as
an example and assume $0.05 per core hour. We also report on the maximal
latency encountered in the simulation and the percentage of comments that met
the target latency of ≤ 0.1s. Finally, we report the number of genesis tuples
created in the ledger, i.e., the number of nicknames in the dataset, and the total
size of the ledger, representing an over-approximation of the storage requirements
of a single day of operation.
Since comments are hashed before signing, the communication overhead is
approximately 2.4 KB, independent of the comment size. To evaluate the storage
requirements on a consensus-based public ledger, we chose Tendermint [42] as
an example. Tendermint employs a modified AVL tree to store key-value pairs.
Values are kept in leaf nodes and keys in non-leaf nodes. The overhead is about
100 bytes per non-leaf node [9]. For the largest dataset, each participant in
Tendermint would thus require approximately 12 GB of space. Once the current
commenting period is over, the signed comments and hence most of the data can
be purged. To allow accountability for censorship over the last month, the data
of the last thirty commenting periods can be stored on less than 0.5 TB.
In summary, the additional cost on the websites is modest compared to the
moderation effort saved.
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scenario #comments #cores daily
cost
max.
latency
latency
< 0.1s
#genesis
tuples
ledger
size(MB)
Nationwide
newspaper (r/de)
168k 1 $ 1.20 0.166s 99,99% 13,975 204
International
news. (url:nytimes)
268k 1 $ 1.20 0.391s 99.99% 87,223 633
Reddit (r/all) 4.9M 3 $ 3.60 1.011s 99.99% 1,217,761 10628
Table 4: Scenarios for performance evaluation, including the number of comments,
source of the data stream, number of Intel E5 2.6 GHz cores, operating cost per day,
maximum latency, percentage of queries answered within 0.1 secs, number of genesis
tuples computed (i.e., number of distinct nicknames), and total ledger size.
6 Limitations
Despite the auditing by the issuer and the limited accountability for collud-
ing issuer and verifiers in the extended protocol, we have centralised trusted
authorities. One way to remove these is to introduce protocols that can recog-
nise Sybils. This could relieve the issuer from the responsibility of auditing the
verifiers and potentially allow for a protocol with accountability features to de-
ter misbehaviour. As this topic is orthogonal to our protocol, we leave it for
future work, but remark that, theoretically, Sybil-detection is possible without
user identification. A potential approach is to combine biometric methods [16,67]
with captchas. Uzun and Chung proposed such a protocol to show liveness. Here,
the user’s response to a captcha involves physical actions (smiling, blinking) that
she captures in a selfie video [71] within a 5s time limit. Their approach is based
on the fact that automated captcha-solving takes considerable time, and face
reenactment (e.g., [68]) is difficult to do at scale. Building on the same assump-
tions, a Sybil-detection scheme could be built by pseudo-randomly defining sets
of users that need to show liveness at the same time.
TrollThrottle aims to provide a similar user experience to website logins.
Hence, all client-side secrets are derived from the login and password of the
user and thus vulnerable to password-guessing attacks. This can be mitigated
by incorporating a two-factor authentication into the protocol, or by setting up
the key generation to require a password of sufficient length and entropy, as to
enforce the use of password managers.
Finally, the client-side code is loaded by the website, which could potentially
include a different script albeit this behaviour would leave traces. As previously
discussed (see Section 5), this is a well-known problem for web-based apps, and
usually mitigated by offering optional plugins.
7 Related work
The detection of astroturfing has been tackled using reputation systems (e.g., [60]),
crowdsourcing (e.g., [73]) and feature-based analysis (e.g., n-gram detection [61],
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sentiment analysis [65], or by analysing responses [59]). Fundamentally, the post-
ing profile of a politically motivated high-effort user is not very different from a
state-sponsored propagandist [50], hence we focus on prevention instead of detec-
tion. The detection and prevention approaches could be combined, but detection
approaches either come at a loss of accountability, or they need to explain their
decisions, although many of them rely on the fact that the bot is not adapting
to the mechanism (e.g., via adversarial machine learning [45]).
Our approach is similar to anonymity protocols in which we specify a way
of exchanging messages without revealing identities. In contrast to anonymity
protocols, TrollThrottle provides anonymity with respect to the ledger, but pre-
sumes the communication channels to provide sufficient anonymity. By itself,
TrollThrottle is not resistant against traffic analysis — here anonymity proto-
cols come into play. One might ask whether anonymity protocols already do
what TrollThrottle proposes to do. To the best of our knowledge, Dissent [33]
is the only anonymity protocol that provides explicit accountability guarantees,
but these pertain to the type of communication, not to sending more messages
than allowed. Furthermore, unlinkability is not achieved within the group, but
towards outsiders. In each protocol phase, parties generate new secondary keys,
which they broadcast signed and encrypted to all members of the group. This
requires setting up a group in advance. This is unsuitable for our setting, where
the group comprises all registered users of a web. TrollThrottle preserves unlink-
ability even within this group.
Pseudonymity systems like Nym [43] or Nymble [47] provide anonymous, yet
authenticated access to services, but some allow resource owners to block access
at their discretion. By using a ledger and a common set of rules, TrollThrottle
users can claim and prove censorship, but have to trust the ledger. This is in con-
trast to p2p-protocols, where censors may be sidestepped, but cannot be forced
to publish the content themselves. Dingledine et al. advocate for the transac-
tion of reputation/credit between pseudonyms [34]. By contrast, the credit in
our scheme is essentially the number of nyms. This simplifies the system and
ensures unlinkability, at the cost of inherent limitations: the ‘credit’ is the same
for every participant (τ for each commenting period) and cannot be transferred.
One of the main cryptographic components of TrollThrottle is a specific DAA
scheme with additional properties (instant-linkability and updatability). DAA
was introduced as a way to address privacy issues of the remote attestation
protocol proposed for TPMs [40]. There exists a number of schemes, e.g., based
on the RSA assumption [21], on elliptic curve cryptography [22, 32], on the
LRSW assumption [20,23] and on the q-SDH assumption [24,30,31]. We focused
on the scheme by Brickell and Li [24], because it supports these properties,
produces short signatures and because a reference implementation was available.
There are building blocks besides DAA that are compatible with TrollThrottle.
Anonymous Credentials (AC) allow users to prove (a set of) attributes about
themselves to third parties, usually via an interactive protocol (but there are non-
interactive schemes). An efficient scheme, by Baldimtsi and Lysyanskaya [17],
supports only single-time use of a credential, which would require to store a
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fresh credential for each comment that the user would like to post in the fu-
ture (the shown attribute would also need to include the date and some unique
value). Multi-show credentials, for instance the one by Camenisch et al. [26],
would decrease the number of fresh credentials required, but would still depend
on the user’s obtain an attribute for every possible day/comment number com-
binations. What’s more concerning is that the attribute value would have to
be set by the issuer to a unique value (to prevent double spending/comment-
ing), which would decrease the privacy of this approach and allow the Issuer to
link certain comments. Therefore, it seems more efficient to use a system that
supports domain-specific pseudonyms with a secret-key based attribute than
lightweight credential systems. It worths noting that DAA can be viewed as
such a credential system for just a single and secret attribute (the secret key).
The most similar credential system to the DAA scheme, that we used, was
proposed by Camenisch et al. [27]. In this system, an issuer creates and dis-
tributes so-called dispensers. Dispensers are used to create a pre-defined number
of one-time credentials valid for a given date. This system can be immediately
used in TrollThrottle. As an implementation was not available, we perform a
qualitative analysis. On the one hand, verification is faster in their scheme, they
perform seven multi-exponentiations in a prime order group and one in an RSA
group, while Brickell and Li’s scheme perform one multi-exponentiation in each
group i.e., G1,G2,GT , and one pairing computation. On the other hand, the sig-
natures, which consists of a unique serial number (similar to a pseudonym) and
a number of proofs of consistency are at least twice as much larger and their size
depend on how the proofs are implemented. This produces considerable compu-
tation and communication overhead in the ledger. Moreover, the verification of
comments is performed by the websites, making verification efficiency less im-
portant than the size of the data included in the ledger. Therefore, the DAA
scheme represents a preferable tradeoff.
8 Conclusion
The prevalence of social bots and other forms of astroturfing in the web poses
a danger to the political discourse. As many newspapers are closing down their
commenting functionality despite the availability of sophisticated detection meth-
ods, we argue that they should be combined with a more preventive approach.
We presented TrollThrottle, a protocol that raises the cost of astroturfing
by limiting the influence of users that emit a large amount of communication,
even if using different pseudonyms. TrollThrottle preserves anonymity, provides
accountability against censorship, it is easy to deploy and comes at a modest
cost. We also discuss its social impact in Appendix D.
By how much do we raise the cost of astroturfing? We shall regard the last
week before the 2016 US election for a rough calculation. The computational
propaganda project considered around 3.4M election-related tweets to be origi-
nating from bots who emit more than 50 messages per day [44]. If we assume a
threshold of 20 messages/day and perfect coordination between the bots, 24 178
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identities need to be stolen to reach the same target. A lab study [19] finds that
users are willing to sell their Facebook accounts for $26 on average, which is
only slightly above the black-market value for stolen verified Facebook accounts.
Such operation would thus face a cost of $634 501 and a risk of detection.
A remaining challenge for future work is to provide Sybil detection without
identifying the users. The verification of user identities inherently relies on the
party asserting them, but, theoretically, this step is not necessary to determine
whether, at a given time, two virtual identities are controlled by independent
parties.
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A Instant linkability
In Brickell and Li’s scheme [24], signatures are composed of the actual signature
and the corresponding pseudonym. To check whether two valid signatures are
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linked, i.e., were created by the same signer with the same dom 6= ⊥, one merely
compares the nyms. We exploit this property to instantly check whether a new
comment is linked to any of the previous comments and thus avoid ‘double
spending’ of basenames. To generalise to other DAA schemes, we formalise this
requirement as follows:
Definition 5 (Instantly linkable DAA scheme). We call a DAA scheme
instantly linkable if:
1. A nym can be generated without knowledge of the data m, i.e., there is a
deterministic poly-time algorithm NymGen s.t. NymGen(skS , dom) =
NymExtract(SignDAA(skS , cred , dom, ·)).
2. Signatures contain a nym that links them, i.e., there is a deterministic poly-
time algorithm NymExtract s.t. for all signatures σ1, σ2, Link(σ1, σ2) = 1 iff
NymExtract(σ1) = NymExtract(σ2).
3. The basename used to create a signature can be checked without knowing the
data m and is uniquely defined by the signature, i.e., there exists a poly-time
algorithm VerifyBsn s.t. for all PPT adversary A, the following probability is
negligible in λ
Pr
[
(dom, dom ′, σ, pk I ,m)←$ A(1λ) :
VerifyBsn(σ, dom ′) = 1 = VerifyBsn(σ, dom) ∧
VerifyDAA(pk I ,m, dom, σ, RL∅) = 1] ,
where RL∅ corresponds to an empty revocation list.
B Security Analysis
Here we show the intuition that the protocol we propose here enforces the thresh-
old τ , valid comments cannot be forged, users remain anonymous and its account-
ability mechanism is sound and complete.
We define the security goals of TrollThrottle in terms of five properties within
an experiment. The adversary has access to oracles for user creation, honest
execution of the commenting procedure and the Join− Issue protocol, and she
can corrupt both users and verifiers. The formal model and full proofs are
available in Appendix G.
1. Correctness, intuitively: honest users should always be able to create and
publish a comment (acceptable by the policy of the website) and the com-
ment should appear on the website. Moreover, if a comment is not published,
the user should be able to generate a claim that can be publicly verified.
2. Protection against trolling, intuitively: the number of valid comments that
the adversary A can produce per basename is at most the number of users
that she corrupted plus the number of users maliciously verified by a cor-
rupted verifier. Let n be the number of user identities under adversarial
TrollThrottle — Raising the Cost of Astroturfing 29
control (either by bribing the user or by bribing the verifiers) this directly
results in the bound τ · n for the number of comments the adversary can
emit per epoch.
3. Non-frameability, A cannot create comments that can be linked to a nym of
an honest user.
4. Anonymity, intuitively: When challenged with distinguishing a comment pro-
duced by a user of her choice from a freshly created user, the adversary can
do no better than a guess.
5. Accountability, intuitively: Whatever the adversary does, for any honestly
generated comment one can produce a verifiable claim that this comment
ought to be published. Furthermore, it is not possible to produce such a
claim in the name of an honest user unless the comment has been produced
by her.
Theorem 1 (Protection against trolling). The TrollThrottle protocol sat-
isfies protection against trolling if the DAA scheme is user-controlled traceable
and instantly linkable, h is collision resistant and we have proofs of knowledge
for the relation RJoin.
Sketch. An adversary can fake comments in three ways:
– by creating a fresh digital identity,
– using an existing signature under a different message, or
– forging valid pseudonyms with acceptable basenames for an existing signa-
ture (this would allow her to publish the same comment multiple times).
An adversary that uses the first strategy can be used to break the user-controlled
traceability of the DAA scheme. The second attack would break collision resis-
tance. Finally, due to instant linkability of the DAA scheme, we conclude that the
adversary cannot find a second nym that is valid under the same basename.
Theorem 2 (Non-frameability). The TrollThrottle protocol satisfies non-frameability
if the underlying DAA scheme is user-controlled traceable and instantly linkable,
the function h is collision-resistant and the proof system for relation RJoin is a
proof of knowledge.
Sketch. We use a similar observation. An adversary that can post in the name
of an honest user generates a forgery for the DAA scheme and thus can be used
to break user-controlled traceability or break the collision-resistance of the hash
function.
Theorem 3 (Anonymity). The TrollThrottle protocol satisfies anonymity if
the underlying DAA scheme provides user-controlled anonymity and the proof
system for relation RJoin is zero-knowledge.
Sketch. Since user-controlled anonymity of the DAA scheme ensures that the
adversary cannot tell which of two uncorrupted users signed a message it follows
that this implies that an adversary cannot also tell which user commented (since
comments are signed using DAA signatures). Note that because of the zero-
knowledge property the proof for relation RJoin can be simulated.
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Theorem 4 (Accountability). The TrollThrottle protocol satisfies account-
ability if it is correct and h is collision-resistant.
Sketch. Correctness of TrollThrottle ensures that honest users can always gener-
ate a valid claim even if an adversary tries to prevent this. The evidence produced
can be compared with the ledger state, as the message is given. If the message
claimed is accepted, but different from a valid entry in the ledger, it constitutes
a collision.
C Holding the issuer accountable
In this section we consider an extended version of our protocol that copes with
an untrusted issuer, i.e., how can we protect against trolling even if the Issuer
is untrusted. The high-level idea is to use so-called genesis tuples for every new
user, which are signed using a standard signature scheme by the verifier checking
the personal data of the user. Then while commenting, the user proofs that there
exists one genesis tuple that corresponds to her identity. A malicious issuer can
create an unlimited number of DAA credentials but cannot generate genesis
tuples at will without colluding with a verifier. We cannot protect against such
a collusion but our approach allows the public to track suspicious behaviour, i.e.,
one verifier is signing a high volume of genesis tuples.
We begin this section by recalling cryptographic primitives used in this ver-
sion. We then show how to extend the existing notion of our accountable com-
menting scheme and define a property we call credibility, which will formally
capture a dishonest issuer trying to selectively troll the system.
C.1 Preliminaries
In addition to an instantly linkable DAA scheme, this scheme assumes a standard
existentially unforgeable digital signature scheme (KGsig, sig, ver). The user has
access to signing oracle for a verifier with key pair (skV , pkV ). Moreover, we
recall the definitions given by Groth et al. [39].
Definition 6 (Zero-Knowledge). A proof system Π is called zero-knowledge,
if there exists a PPT simulator Sim = (S1, S2) such that for all PPT algorithms
A the following probability, denoted by Adv[AZKΠ ], is negligible in the security
parameter 1λ:∣∣∣Pr [ρ← Setup(1λ) : ACreateProof(ρ,·,·)(ρ) = 1]−
Pr
[
(ρ, τ)← S1(1λ) : AS(ρ,τ,·,·)(ρ) = 1
]∣∣∣ ,
where τ is a trapdoor information, S(ρ, τ, x, w) = S2(ρ, τ, x) for (x,w) ∈ R and
both oracles output ⊥ if (x,w) 6∈ R.
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Definition 7 (Soundness). A proof system Π is called sound, if for all PPT
algorithms A the following probability, denoted by Adv[AsoundΠ ], is negligible in
the security parameter 1λ:
Pr
[
ρ← Setup(1λ),
(x, pi)← A(ρ) :
VerifyProof(ρ, x, pi) = accept
∧ x 6∈ LR
]
.
Definition 8 (Knowledge Extraction). A proof system Π is called a proof
of knowledge for R, if there exists a knowledge extractor Extr = (E1, E2) as
described below. For all algorithms A:
|Pr[ρ← Setup(1λ) : A(ρ) = 1]−
Pr[(ρ, τ)← E1(1λ) : A(ρ) = 1]| ≤ Adv[AE1Π ]
Pr[(ρ, τ)← E1(1λ), (x, pi)← A(ρ), w ← E2(ρ, τ, x, pi) :
VerifyProof(ρ, x, pi) = reject ∨ (x,w) ∈ R] = 1]
Adv[AE1Π ] is negligible in 1λ.
C.2 Accountable Commenting Scheme with Credibility (ACSC)
We define an accountable commenting scheme with the additional property of
credibility as follows:
Definition 9 (ACSC). An accountable commenting scheme with credibility
consists of a tuple of algorithms (Setup,KeyGen,Comment,Verify,Claim,VerifyClaim,
Attribute) and an interactive protocol (Join− Issue) with inputs and outputs spec-
ified as follows.
All algorithms are defined in a similar way to the ones for the standard
scheme presented in Def. 1. The only differences are as follows:
1. the Join algorithm of the Join− Issue protocol additionally outputs a genesis
tuple gb,
2. the Comment, Verify and VerifyClaim algorithms take as an additional list
GB containing genesis tuples.
In addition, we define the PPT algorithm Attribute(gb) that allows the public
to attribute a genesis tuple gb to a verifier V by outputting the verifier’s public
key, which uniquely identifies the verifier. Even if the issuer is colluding with
selected verifiers, the public can attribute users to verifiers, and thus gather
statistics on how many users were verified by which V that could expose cheaters.
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C.3 Instantiation
We will now define an efficient instantiation of an accountable commenting
scheme with credibility. The scheme closely resembles the scheme presented in
Def. 3 but includes the generation and verification of genesis tuples. In particu-
lar, let use define the following relation that users will use to prove knowledge
of genesis tuples:
((nym, dom,GB), (skS)) ∈ RGB ⇐⇒
∃(·,nym1, ·) ∈ GB ∧ nym1 = NymGen(skS , 1)
∧ nym = NymGen(skS , dom).
Definition 10. Extended TrollThrottle Protocol
Setup(1λ) - compute ρGB ←$ SetupZK(1λ), ρJoin ←$ SetupZK(1λ) and output ρ =
(1λ, ρJoin, ρGB).
KeyGen(ρ) - equal to KeyGen in Def. 3.
Join(pk I, skU ,U ) - parse pk I = pk I,DAA and skU = skU,DAA. Execute com ←$
JoinDAA(pk I,DAA, skU,DAA) and compute proof ΠJoin = CreateProof(ρJoin, (com, pk I,DAA), skU,DAA).
Send (com, ΠJoin) to the issuer and receive credU .
Compute the pseudonym nym1 = NymGen(skU , 1), and set gbU = (pkV ,nym1, sig(skV ,nym1)),
where sig(skV ,nym1) was created by an identity verifier.
Return (credU , skU ), gbU ).
Issue(sk I, ver,U ) - equal to Issue in Def. 3.
Comment(pk I, skU , credU , dom,m) - set and return γ = (σ,nym, dom, h(m), Π)
where Π = CreateProof(ρGB, (nym, dom,GB), skU )), σ = SignDAA(skU , credU , dom, h(m))
and nym ←$ NymGen(skU , dom) = NymExtract(σ).
Verify(pk I,nym, dom,GB,m, γ) - Parse pk I = pk I,DAA and γ = (σ,nym, dom, h,Π).
Output 1 iff
– VerifyDAA(pk I,DAA, h, dom, σ, RL∅) = 1,
– if h(m) = h,
– NymExtract(σ) = nym,
– VerifyBsn(σ, dom) = 1.
– VerifyProof(ρGB, (nym, dom,GB), Π)) = 1.
Claim(pk I, skU , cred , dom,m, γ) - Claim in Def. 3.
VerifyClaim(pk I,GB, dom,m, γ, evidence) - return 1 iff γ is valid for m, i.e., that
Verify(pk I,nym, dom,GB,m, γ) = 1.
Attribute(gb) - parse gb = (pkV ,nym1, sig(skV ,nym1) and return pkV .
C.4 Security Analysis
Here we will formally define what it means for an accountable commenting
scheme to have the credibility property and proof that the scheme presented
above fulfils it.
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Definition 11. We say that the system is credible if for every adversary A,
every 1λ, the probability Pr[ExpcredibilityA (1
λ) = 1] is negligible 1λ.
Experiment ExpcredibilityA (1
λ):
CU← ∅; V ← ∅; ver← ∅;
(sk I, pk I)←$ Setup(1λ)
O = {CorruptVer(·, ver), JoinSystem(·, ver, sk I)}
OUT = {(nym∗i , dom∗i ,m∗i , γ∗i )}ki=1 ←$ AO(ρ, sk I)
Return 0 if Verify(pk I,nym
∗
i , dom
∗
i ,m
∗
i , γ
∗
i ) = 0 for any i ∈ {1, . . . , k}
S = {(nym, dom) : ((·,nym, dom, ·)) ∈ OUT}
t = max(·,dom)∈S |{(nym) : (nym, dom) ∈ S}|
Return 1 iff t > |VM|
Fig. 8
Theorem 5 (Credibility). The Extended TrollThrottle protocol (see Def. 10)
satisfies credibility (see Def. 11) if the underlying DAA scheme is instantly link-
able (Def. 5) and the proof system for relation RGB is sound.
Proof. The idea behind the proof is as follows. Because we know that to win an
adversary has to return t > |VM| valid signatures for one basename but at the
same time there exist only |VM| genesis tuples. It is easy to see now that if the
adversary wins, then there must exist at least proof Π∗i , where γ
∗
i = (·, ·, ·, ·, Π∗i )
that is false and can be used to break the soundness property of the proof
system. Note that this follows from the fact that because of instant linkability
there can only exist |VM| secret keys that form the pseudonyms nym1 in a
genesis tuple.
C.5 Efficient instantiation of the proof for relation RGB
Pseudonyms in the scheme by Brickel and Li are of the form h(dom)skS , where h
is a collision-resistant hash function that maps elements from {0, 1} to elements
of a group G of order q and the secret key skS is an element in Z∗q . It follows
that in such a case we have nym1 = h(1)
skS and nym = h(dom)skS .
To generateΠ we will make use of the proof system by Groth and Kohlweiss [38].
They showed an interactive Σ-protocol for the following statement. Given n
commitments c1, . . . , cn at least one opens to 0. The communication size is loga-
rithmic in n, which means that by applying the Fiat-Shamir transformation we
receive a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of the same size. Note that this
proof system requires the commitment scheme to be homomorphic and the mes-
sage space to be Zq. In particular, Groth and Kohlweiss show that their proof
system works for Pedersen commitments where com(x, r) = gx · gˆr for some
elements g, gˆ ∈ G.
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We will now show an efficient proof system for the following statement: Given
dom,nym and ledger L with genesis tuples gb1, . . . , gbb (where gbi =
(·,nymi1, ·))
there exists a secret key skS and an index j such that nym = NymGen(skS , dom)
and nymj1 = NymGen(skS , 1). First we notice that by setting g = h(1) and
gˆ = h(2) we can use g, gˆ as parameters for a Pedersen commitment scheme.
What’s more, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} we have nymi1 = com(sk (i)S , 0) where sk (i)S is
the secret key of the user that generated tuple gbi.
To create proof Π the Prover with secret witness skS , j proceeds as follows:
1. computes a commitment c = com(skS , r) using random coins r ∈ Zq,
2. for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} computes ci = c/nymi1 = com(skS − sk (i)S , r),
3. computes proof pi using the system by Groth and Kohlweiss that one of
c1, . . . , cn is a commitment to 0,
4. returns proof Π = (c, pi).
To verify the proof a Verifier proceeds as follows:
1. for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} computes ci = c/nym(i)1 ,
2. verifies proof pi using c1, . . . , cn as part of the statement and returns true if
and only if this proof is valid.
D Impact on society
We provide a solution for newspapers that want to interact with their readership,
but cannot bear the cost of moderation. As of now, among the Top 10 websites in
the Alexa ‘News’ section that belongs to a newspaper, three do not offer on-site
commenting, two others disable commenting functionality for controversial topics
and four require a Facebook signup with a real name. The last one apparently has
this functionality, but did not display any comments or provide a link to leave
one, presumably due to a glitch. Hence any technique making this interaction
feasible again is an improvement to the political discourse. We shall nevertheless
discuss some implications in case TrollThrottle, or a similar system, should be
adopted in larger parts of the web.
Setting the threshold From a technical view point, setting the threshold is a
matter of balancing the number of regular users that post beyond this threshold
with some target cost that an astroturfing operation should incur. From this
perspective, there should be a clear demarcation between bots and regular users,
that is characterised among other features by the number of messages these users
send. This is, however, not the case, as the journalist Michael Kreil argues in
response to a scientific study that used text mining and other learning techniques
to recognise social bots [41]. He contacted these purported bots and found out
that many of them were, in fact, real people who post well over 150 politically
divisive messages per day [50]. In our evaluation database, we found that around
2 % of users are above the threshold of 20 messages per day. Upon inspection,
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some of those can be categorised as bots, but many are just very active users
or cannot be clearly distinguished from those. One particular user posts a daily
average of 96 messages on a cricket-related forum. He or she is just a big sports
fan. If, in addition to the daily limit, we impose a limit of 100 comments a week
and 300 comments per month, then only an additional 443 Reddit users will be
affected, compared to 206 855 out of 6 619 612 users affected by the daily limit
itself (in June 2019).
This shows that the system can be set up to avoid affecting intensive users,
but, ultimately, there is no threshold that distinguishes trolls from intensive
users. During the world cup match between India and Afghanistan in June, e.g.,
the aforementioned cricket fan posted 928 comments. The method we propose
is thus affecting the political discourse. It discourages communication patterns
employed by power users. This is not necessarily a bad thing, as collective belief
formation is driven both by learning from the (stated) beliefs of others and by
some interest in maintaining social acceptance [53]. Due to the difficulty of map-
ping virtual identities to real-world identities, one may argue that the discourse
stands to benefit from a limit on the messages, which favours thought-out contri-
butions. In summary, we propose a method for moderation instead of a clear-cut
filtering mechanism. It can enable discussion where, currently, there is none. It
can be adjusted to accommodate for fluctuations in use by evaluating current
patterns, it will impose restrictions on a minority of users.
Centralisation of discourse The public ledger provides a centralised view
of the discourse on participating websites, even if its implementation is decen-
tralised. This offers several potential advantages: with a slight modification of the
protocol, the user can optionally add a pseudonym nymrep = NymGen(skU , x)
for some arbitrary x (e.g., by signing the comment again under an additional
basename x), to make a set of messages — across websites — cryptographically
linkable. Users can thus build a reputation across websites. Similarly, we may
add yet another pseudonym nymthr = NymGen(skU , tid), with tid some global
identifier for discussion threads, to ensure that authors have only one identity
per thread and don’t respond to themselves with a different account. Websites
could, theoretically, stop providing their own infrastructure for user registration,
and only permit signed posts to appear, providing essentially projections of the
ledger’s representation of the public discourse.
While these features seem appealing, the idea of a centralised political dis-
course beyond news websites has to be seen critically. Most importantly, it may
undermine the incentives of the issuer described in Section E.1, so she might take
the risk and collaborate with a malicious verifier. In our view, this scenario is
unlikely. According to a 2018 study, about two thirds of U.S. adults obtain their
news on social media sites, about 43% from Facebook [66]. The business model
of most of these social media sites is based on exclusive access to their users’
information; hence they have little interest to share it. Our focus is therefore on
traditional news pages, who benefit from a healthy discourse.
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E Formal analysis of the deferred verification and
auditing protocol
theory T r o l l T h r o t t l e
begin
b u i l t i n s : hashing
f u n c t i o n s :
pk /1 , sk /1 [ p r i v a t e ] ,
s i gn /3 , v e r i f y /3 , extrmsg /1 ,
t rue /0
equat ions :
v e r i f y ( s i gn (m, r , sk ( i ) ) , m, pk ( i ) ) = true ,
extrmsg ( s i gn (m, r , x))=m
l e t I s s u e r =
l e t
sk I = sk ( ’ I ’ )
skV = sk ( ’V’ )
pkV = pk ( ’V’ )
m1 = s i d
pat m2 = <l og in , h(<rU , nbd , ’1 ’>)>
c I = h( rI , s id , h(<rU , nbd , ’1 ’ > ) )
m3 = s ign ( cI , r3 , sk I )
s1 = h(< rI , s id , ’2 ’>)
s2 = h(m5)
cla im = <rI , s id , pat m2 ,m5>
in
out (m1) ;
in (pat m2 ) ;
new r I ;
new r3 ;
out (m3) ;
in (m5) ;
i f v e r i f y (m5, cI , pkV)=true ( ) then
event Accepted ( nbd ) ;
( // case d i s t i n c t i o n : the a t tacke r may dec ide to play a game
( in ( xs1 ) ; // ( a ) the d i shone s t v e r i f i e r t r i e s to
// p r e d i c t s1 to avoid aud i t ing
i f xs1 = s1 then
event V e r i f i e r P r e d i c t ( )
)
+
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( // (b) only i f the v e r i f i e r does not want to play t h i s game ,
// she l e a r n s r I
out(< s id , r I >); // we may use a pub l i c channel here ,
// because V cons ide r ed d i shone s t anyway
out ( c la im )
)
)
l e t V e r i f i e r =
l e t
sk I = sk ( ’ I ’ )
pkI = pk ( ’ I ’ )
skV = sk ( ’V’ )
c I = h(< rI , s id , h(<rU , nbd , ’1 ’>)>)
pat m4 = <nbd , cI , rU , xm3>
m5 = s ign ( cI , r5 , skV)
s1 = h(< rI , s id , ’2 ’>)
s2 = h(m5)
in
in (pat m4 ) ;
i f v e r i f y (xm3 , cI , pkI)=true ( ) then
lock c I ; // make sure that f o r the same cI ,
// only one execut ion i s s t a r t e d
in ( ev idence ) ;
event V e r i f i e d (nbd , ev idence ) ;
new r5 ;
event InResponse ( rI , s id ,m5) ;
( // As be fore , adversary can dec ide
( in ( xs2 ) ; // ( a ) to l e t a d i shone s t i s s u e r t ry to p r e d i c t s2
// as to chose m5 in a way that avo ids aud i t ing
i f xs2 = s2 then
event I s s u e r P r e d i c t ( )
)
+
( // (b) cont inue the protoco l , as usua l
out (m5) ;
in (< s id , r I >);
// s t a r t i n g from here , assume an audit takes p lace
// ( adversary can dec ide whether to run t h i s s tep )
out(<rU , nbd>)
)
)
l e t CheckClaim = l e t
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// A d i shone s t i s s u e r t r i e s to c la im that V needs to send
// evidence , a lthough the va lue s do not match .
// I c o n t r o l s s1 but honest V choses s2
// Hence the i s s u e r wins i f she can send s1 and s2 that pass
// checking , but s2 was not the answer o f v e r i f i e r to s i d and
// r I used to computed i t
sk I = sk ( ’ I ’ )
skV = sk ( ’V’ )
pkV = pk ( ’V’ )
m3 = s ign ( cI , r3 , sk I )
pat claim = <rI , s id , xm2 , xm5>
c I = h( rI , s id , xm2)
/∗ s1 = h(< rI , s id , ’2 ’>) // not used , but t h i s can be used to recompute the check ∗/
s2 = h(xm5) //
in
in ( pat claim ) ;
i f v e r i f y (xm5 , cI , pkV) = true ( ) then
event ClaimAccept ( rI , s id , xm5)
! (
( new s i d ; I s s u e r )
| V e r i f i e r )
| CheckClaim
| ! ( in (p : pub ) ; event Corrupted (p ) ; out ( sk (p ) ) )
lemma san i ty : // c o n s i d e r s d i shone s t user
e x i s t s−t r a c e
”Ex nbd #i . Accepted ( nbd ) @ i
&
not (Ex #j p . Corrupted (p) @j )
”
lemma authent i c i ty accept : // c o n s i d e r s d i shone s t user
” Al l nbd #i . Accepted ( nbd ) @ i ==>
(Ex #j ev idence . V e r i f i e d (nbd , ev idence ) @ j )
| (Ex #j . Corrupted ( ’V’ ) @j )
| (Ex #j . Corrupted ( ’ I ’ ) @j )
”
lemma unpred issuer :
” Al l #i . I s s u e r P r e d i c t ( ) @i ==> Ex #j . Corrupted ( ’V’ ) @j”
lemma unpred ver i f i ed :
” Al l #i . V e r i f i e r P r e d i c t ( ) @i ==> Ex #j . Corrupted ( ’ I ’ ) @j”
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lemma authent i c i ty c la im : // i f c la im i s accepted , then the
// v e r i f i e r indeed responded to va lue s
// that determine the d e c i s i o n
” Al l r i s i d m5 #i . ClaimAccept ( r i , s id ,m5) @ i
==> (Ex #j . InResponse ( r i , s id ,m5) @ j )
| (Ex #j . Corrupted ( ’V’ ) @j )
”
end
E.1 Goals & Incentives
A system like TrollThrottle can only be deployed if all parties have incentives to
run it and we build our design on the following incentives.
Websites: Websites have an incentive to get information about the trolls to
lessen the burden on moderation and save on personnel. The system requires
paying the issuer a fee for running the infrastructure; hence these costs must
be covered by the websites’ fee to the issuer. As they benefit from the system,
they have an incentive to pay, as long as it is not possible to piggyback on
the system. The information necessary to determine whether a user is a troll
must hence only be available to paying websites. This can be achieved by using
public-key encryption, see below.
Issuer: The issuer runs a service and collects a fee. She relies on the trust of
the websites to maintain her business. The short-term gain of accepting bribery
for issuing non-validated DAA certificates could, however, outweigh the loss of
this trust and the potential failing of her business. First, the protocol only allows
forging identities in collusion with a verifier. Second, it is possible to keep track of
the number of identities in the system that each verifier attested to by modifying
the protocol (see Section 4). If a verifier confirms an unusually large number of
identities or it is inconsistent with public information (e.g., subscriber lists; the
circulation of newspapers is independently audited in most countries, as it is
used to set advertising rates), this will raise doubts. A fake identity can thus be
linked to the verifier that colluded in creating it. Hence, both the issuer and the
verifier carry the risk of exposure, which grows with the number of fake identities
they produce.
Verifiers: The verifier’s incentive to participate is that it is either being paid
(IVS), run by one of the participating websites (subscriber list) or is a readily
available governmental service (smart passports/identity cards). For an IVS, as
well as the government issuing smart identification documents, trustworthiness
is existential. By adding a pseudo-probabilistic procedure to the protocol (see
Sec. 4), large-scale fraud can be detected with high probability, which would
terminate the IVS’s business. For newspapers, the participating websites need
to carefully decide, which subscriber list they accept — the newspaper should
have a reputation to lose. As discussed before, a dishonest issuer has to collude
with a dishonest verifier. In this case, they can quietly skip the audit; however,
the public can still determine the number of identities verified per verifier. This
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allows at least some amount of public scrutiny, as, e.g., the approximate size
of the subscriber list is publicly known. One could make the auditing publicly
verifiable. This, however, comes the expense of some users’ privacy.
F Review and adoption of the security model taken from
[24]
We review Brickell and Li’s security model [24], including the user-controlled-
anonymity and user-controlled-traceability experiment. Their DAA scheme sat-
isfies both notions under the decisional/ strong Diffie-Hellmann assumption. We
slightly simplify their model, as our protocol’s computations are performed by
a single host and not split between a TPM and an untrusted device.
Definition 12 (User-controlled-anonymity). A DAA scheme is user-controlled-
anonymous if no PPT adversary can win the following game between a challenger
C and an adversary A, i.e., if Adv[AanonymityDAA ] = Pr[A wins] is negligible:
– Initial: C runs SetupDAA(1λ) and gives the resulting sk I and pk I to A.
– Phase 1: C is probed by A who makes the following queries:
• Sign: A submits a signer’s identity S, a basename dom (either ⊥ or a
data string) and a message m of her choice to C, who runs SignDAA to
get a signature σ and responds with σ.
• Join: A submits a signer’s identity S of her choice to C, who runs JoinDAA
with A to create skS and to obtain a set of valid credentials credS from
A. C verifies the validation of credS and keeps skS secret.
• Corrupt: A submits a signer’s identity S of her choice to C, who responds
with the value skDAA of the signer.
– Challenge: At the end of phase 1, A chooses two signers’ identities S0 and
S1, a message m and a basename dom of her choice to C. A must not have
made any Corrupt query on either S0 or S1, and not have made the Sign
query with the same dom if dom 6=⊥ with either S0 or S1. To make the
challenge, C chooses a bit b uniformly at random, signs m associated with
dom under (skSb , credSb) to get a signature σ and returns σ to A.
– phase 2: A continues to probe C with the same type of queries that it made
in phase 1. Again, A is not allowed to corrupt any signer with the identity
either S0 or S1, and not allowed to make any Sign query with dom if dom
6=⊥ with either S0 or S1.
– Response: A returns a bit b′. We say that the adversary wins the game if
b = b′
Definition 13 (User-controlled-traceability). A DAA scheme is user-controlled-
traceable if no probabilistic polynomial-time adversary can win the following game
between a challenger C and an adversary A, i.e., if Adv[AtraceDAA] = Pr[A wins] is
negligible:
– Initial: C runs SetupDAA(1λ), gives the resulting pk I to A but keeps sk I .
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– Phase 1: C is probed by A who makes the following queries:
• Sign: The same as in the game of user-controlled-anonymity.
• Join: There are two cases of this query. Case 1: A submits a signer’s
identity S of her choice to C, who runs Join− IssueDAA to create skDAA
and cred for the signer. Case 2: A submits a signer’s identity S with
a skDAA value of her choice to C, who runs Join− IssueDAA to create
cred for the signer and puts the given skDAA into a revocation list RL. C
responds the query with cred.
Suppose that A does not use a single S for both of the cases.
• Corrupt. This is the same as in the game of user-controlled-anonymity,
except that at the end C puts the revealed secret key into the list RL.
– Forge: A returns a signer’s identity S, a signature σ, it’s signed message m
and the associated basename dom.
We say that the adversary wins the game if
1. VerifyDAA(pk I ,m, dom, σ, RL) = 1(accepted), but σ is no response of the
existing Sign queries,
and/or
2. In the case of dom 6=⊥, there exists another signature σ′ associated with
the same identity and dom, and the output of LinkDAA(σ, σ
′) is 0 (un-
linked).
We will use the following notation to denote the queries made by the adver-
sary:
SignDAA(S, dom,m) - On input of a signer’s identity S, a basename dom (either
⊥ or a data string), a message m the oracle returns signature σ.
HJoinDAA(S) - On input of a signer’s identity S of her choice, the adversary
obtains credentials credS . The secret key skS is kept secret by the oracle.
This oracle corresponds to Case 1 joining.
JoinDAA(S, skS) - On input of a signer’s identity S of her choice and a secret
key skS , the adversary obtains credentials credS . This oracle corresponds to
Case 2 joining.
IHJoin(S) - On input of a signer’s identity S of her choice, this interactive
honest user joining oracle allows the adversary to issue credentials for an
honest user in the name of the issuer. This oracle represents the Join oracle
defined in user-controlled-anonymity.
CorruptUserDAA(S) - On input of a signer’s identity S, the value sk is returned
to the adversary
Definition 14 (correctness). If both the signer and verifier are honest, then
the signatures and their links generated by the signer will be accepted by the
verifier with overwhelming probability, i.e., for any secret key skS in the user’s
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secret key space if
(pk I , sk I)← SetupDAA(1λ),
(com)← JoinDAA(pk I , skS),
(credS)← IssueDAA(sk I , com),
σ0 ← SignDAA(skS , cred ,m0, dom), and
σ1 ← SignDAA(skS , cred ,m1, dom),
then, with overwhelming probability,
1← VerifyDAA(pk I ,m, dom, σi), i ∈ {0, 1}
and
1← LinkDAA(σ0, σ1).
Brickell and Li’s scheme is easily shown to fulfil our requirement that the
Link function can also be represented using the pseudonym that is included in
the signature. This pseudonym is fixed per identity and per basename.
Theorem 6. For any cryptographic collision resistant hash function h : {0, 1}∗ →
G, Brickell and Li’s scheme [24] is an instantly linkable DAA scheme if we de-
fine:
NymExtract(σ) ··= σ2
NymGen(skS , dom) ··= h(dom)skS
VerifyBsn(σ, dom) ··=
{
1 if σ1 = h(dom)
0 otherwise
where σ = (σ1, . . . , σ9).
Proof. It is easy to see that pseudonyms of the form h(dom)skS are already used
by the Brickell and Li scheme but are hidden as part of the signature (i.e., as
σ2). Thus, NymExtract and NymGen work according to the definition of instant
linkability. Lastly, we note that the first element of the signature σ1 is actually
the base under which we compute the pseudonym, i.e., h(dom). Note that in
our system we always use domain-based DAA signatures and this element is in
the range of the hash function and not a random element (as also allowed in the
Brickell and Li scheme).
Theorem 7. Brickell and Li’s scheme [24] with a minor modification is an
updateable DAA scheme.
Proof. The main observation is that in the Join− IssueDAA protocol the user
computes a Diffie-Hellman public key F = hf1 and computes a Schnorr like proof
for f , i.e., it computes R = h
rf
1 , challenge c = h(pk I ||nonce||F ||R) and proof
sf = rf + c · f . The generator h1 is part of the public key pk I , nonce is some
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nonce send by the issuer to prevent replay attacks and u = (F, c, sf , nonce).
What’s more, the setup algorithm the generator h1 by directly sampling a group
element, i.e., it is generated using public coins .
One can easily notice that we can set gpk1 = (h1) (including the group
definition), where gpk2 contains the remaining parameters (see [24] for a full
specification). The only problem we have to tackle with is that the challenge c,
used to generate the proof sf , contains the full public parameters pk I . Indeed,
there is no reason to include the full pk I besides to protect against cross issuer
attacks, i.e., a malicious man-in-the-middle could register a user into a different
DAA system (with a different pk I). However, in our case we want this to be
true. What’s more important here is that changing the challenge does not break
the soundness of the proof. Since, the used proof is a standard Fiat-Shamir
instantiation of a sigma protocol, it is sufficient that challenge contains remaining
values.
G Proofs of security
We first define the adversarial model in terms of the oracles at the attacker’s
disposal. Then we treat introduce and prove each security property, one by one.
G.1 Model Oracles
To model the security of the protocol, we first define the adversarial capabilities
in terms of a set of oracles that will be used in the following security definitions.
The challenger in all these definitions is defined in terms of these oracles and the
winning condition of the adversary.
Definition 15. We define the following oracles and global sets CU, HU, VM,
USK, CH, COMM that are initially set empty:
CorruptUser(U ) - on input of the user identifier this oracle, checks if there is a
tuple (U , skU , credU ) ∈ USK then output (skU , credU ). Otherwise it outputs
⊥. Finally, it adds U to the set CU and sets HU = HU \ {U }.
CorruptVer(U , ver, V ) - on input of the user identifier and database ver, this
oracle sets ver[V,U ] = 1 and adds (V,U ) to the set VM.
CreateHonestUser(U , ver, sk I, V ) - this oracle first checks that U 6∈ HU∪CU and
returns ⊥ if not. Then it sets ver[V,U ] = 1 and runs the Join− Issue protocol,
receiving (skU , credU ). Finally, it adds (U , skU , credU , V ) into USK and U
to HU.
JoinSystem(U , ver, sk I, V ) - this oracle first checks that U 6∈ HU∪CU, ver[V,U ] =
1 and that (·,U ) 6∈ VM. It returns ⊥, if both checks fail. Then, it interactively
executes Issue(sk I, ver,U ) by communicating with the adversary.
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HJoinSystem(U , ver, pk I, V ) - this oracle first checks that U 6∈ HU ∪ CU and
(·,U ) 6∈ VM. It returns ⊥ if both checks fails. Then it sets ver[V,U ] = 1, sam-
ples a fresh secret key skU and interactively executes the Join(pk I, skU ,U )
protocol with the adversary, receiving credU . It then adds (U , skU , credU , V )
to USK and U into HU.
CreateComment(U , dom,m, pk I) - this oracle first checks that U ∈ HU and then
computes (nym, γ) ←$ Comment(pk I, skU , credU , dom,m). Finally, it adds
(U ,nym, dom,m, γ) to COMM and outputs γ and the pseudonym nym.
Challb(U , dom,m, sk I, pk I) - this oracle first checks that U ∈ HU and returns
⊥ if not. If (U , dom, skU ,dom , credU ,dom) 6∈ CH then the oracle executes
the Join− Issue protocol to receive a new secret key skU ,dom and credential
credU ,dom . Then it adds (U , dom, skU ,dom , credU ,dom) to CH and computes:
if b = 0: (nym, γ)←$ Comment(pk I, skU , credU , dom,m),
else if b = 1: (nym, γ)←$ Comment(pk I, skU ,dom , credU ,dom , dom,m)
Finally, it outputs γ and pseudonym nym.
G.2 Protection against trolling
Definition 16. We say that the system protects against trolling if for every
adversary A, every 1λ, the probability Pr[ExptrollA (1λ) = 1] is negligible 1λ.
Experiment ExptrollA (1
λ):
CU← ∅; HU← ∅; V ← ∅;
USK← ∅; COMM← ∅; ver← ∅;
(sk I, pk I)←$ Setup(1λ)
O = {CorruptUser(·),CreateHonestUser(·, ver, sk I),
CorruptVer(·, ver), JoinSystem(·, ver, sk I),CreateComment(·, ·, ·, pk I)}
OUT = {(nym∗i , dom∗i ,m∗i , γ∗i )}ki=1 ←$ AO(ρ, pk I)
OUT = OUT \ {(nym, dom,m, γ) : (·,nym, dom,m, γ) ∈ COMM}
Return 0 if Verify(pk I,nym
∗
i , dom
∗
i ,m
∗
i , γ
∗
i ) = 0 for any i ∈ {1, . . . , k}
S = {(nym, dom) : (nym, dom, ·, ·) ∈ OUT}
t = max(·,dom)∈S |{(nym) : (nym, dom) ∈ S}|
Return 1 if t > |CU|+ |VM|
Fig. 9
Theorem 8 (Protection against trolling). The TrollThrottle protocol (see
Def. 3) satisfies protection against trolling (see Def. 16) if the underlying DAA
scheme provides user-controlled traceability (Def. 13) and is instantly linkable
(Def. 5), the user hash function is collision-resistant and the proof system for
relation RJoin is a proof of knowledge.
Proof. We begin this proof by noting that the adversary can only win the trolling
experiment in three ways.
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1. by finding a comment with a DAA signature σ under basename dom1 and
message m that is also valid for basename dom2 and message m, where
dom1 6= dom2.
2. forging a signature for an honest user for message m∗ where there exists a
tuple (·, ·, ·,m, ·) ∈ COMM for which h(m∗) = h(m).
3. by creating a “fake” new user without interacting with the issuer or forging
a signature for an honest user for message m∗ where there exists no tuple
(·, ·, ·,m, ·) ∈ COMM for which h(m∗) = h(m).
We will now show that any adversary has only a negligible probability to
actually perform any of the above attacks. To do so, we will create reductions
that interact with the adversary and a DAA challenger for the user-controlled
traceability. However, first we show how those reductions will answer the oracle
queries of the adversary. In every case, the reduction will play the role of the
adversary against the DAA scheme. Thus, it will receive the public key of the
DAA issuer pk I . Moreover, every reduction will keep its own local vector ver
(initially zero) and initially empty lists HUR, CUR (different than the ones used
in the definitions) and COMM.
Generic way of answering oracle queries by the reduction
CorruptVer(U , ver) - on a corrupt verification query, the reduction just sets the
local value ver[U ] to 1.
CreateHonestUser(U , ver, sk I) - on an honest user creation query, the reduction
returns credU if (U , credU ) ∈ HUR. If such a tuple does not exist, it queries
the DAA HJoinDAA(S) oracle, where S = U , receives a DAA credentials
credS and adds (U , credU ) into HUR and returns credU = credS .
CorruptUser(U ) - on a corrupt honest user query, the reduction returns ⊥ if
there exists no tuple (U , credU ) ∈ HUR. Otherwise, it queries the DAA
oracle CorruptUserDAA(S), where S = U and receives the DAA secret key
skU = skS and credentials credU = credS . The reductions updates HUR =
HUR \ {(U , credU )}, add (U , skU , credU ) to CUR and returns skU = skS .
JoinSystem(U , ver, sk I) - on a corrupt user joining query, the reduction returns
⊥ if ver[U ] = 0 or (U , ·) ∈ HUR. The reduction then uses the extraction
algorithm Extr to extract skS fromΠJoin. It then uses its own JoinDAA(U , skS)
and obtains credentials credS . The reduction then adds (U , skS , credS) to
CUR and returns credU = credS to the adversary.
CreateComment(U , dom,m, pk I) - on a commenting query, the reduction first
checks that the query is for an honest user, i.e., that (U , ·) ∈ HUR and
returns ⊥ if this is not the case. It then uses its own signing oracle to query
SignDAA(U , dom,m) receiving signature σ and computes nym = NymExtract(σ).
Finally, it returns γ = (σ,nym,m, dom) and it adds (U ,nym, dom,m, γ) into
COMM.
If the Extr fail, then the reduction also fails. Thus, it is easy to see that the
probability of any reduction in simulating the real experiment without error
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depends heavily on this algorithm. Fortunately, we assumed that they fail only
with negligible probability, so does our reduction.
Case 1 We will now discuss that there cannot exist any adversary that can use
the first attack strategy. This basically follows from the instant linkability of
the DAA scheme, i.e., because of the VerifyBsn, we ensure that signatures are
linked to basenames and the probability that any A finds such a “collision” is
negligible.
To show this more formally, let us assume that there exists an adversary A
that wins by returning a valid comment γ1 = (σ
∗, ·, dom∗,m∗) where (·,nym∗, dom∗,m∗, γ1) 6∈
COMM but there exists a tuple γ2 = (σ
∗, ·, dom,m∗) such that (·,nym∗, dom,m∗, γ2) ∈
COMM, which is what we assumed in this case. However, because both commit-
ments are valid we know that VerifyBsn(σ∗, dom∗) = 1 and VerifyBsn(σ∗, dom) =
1, and VerifyDAA(pk I ,m, dom
∗, σ∗, RL∅) = 1 and VerifyDAA(pk I ,m, dom, σ
∗, RL∅) =
1. Thus, we found a “collision” and broke the instant linkability property of the
DAA scheme for which we assumed that there exists no PPT adversary with
non-negligible probability.
Case 2 It is easy to see that by winning in this case the adversary A can be used
to break collision-resistance of the hash function h. The reduction just returns
(m,m∗) as a collision for h.
Case 3 We will now show that in case 2 if there exists an adversary A against
the trolling experiment, then we can use it to construct a reduction R against
the user-controlled-traceability experiment. In particular, we have shown above
that how R can answer all possible queries of A using its own oracles for the
user-controlled-traceability experiment. Thus, at some point A will conclude
and return a list OUT. We assume without loss of generality that this list does
not contain any of the signatures returned as part of the CreateComment or-
acle queries. Note that the experiment explicitly disallows such tuples. Since
we assumed that A wins the experiment, thus there must exist a basename
dom for which max(·,dom)∈S = t > |CU| + |VM|, where S = {(nym, dom) :
(·,nym, dom, ·) ∈ OUT}. However, what this implies is that there must exist
exactly t valid DAA signatures in OUT for the basename dom. Let us denote
those signatures under respectively pseudonyms nym1, . . . ,nymt and messages
m1, . . . ,mt as σ1, . . . , σt. We also know that all nym1, . . . ,nymt are distinct.
What’s more, because of instant linkability we know that there exist secret
keys sk1, . . . , sk t for which nymi = NymGen(sk i, dom), where there is at least
one secret key sk j which was not extracted by the reduction (and put in on
the revocation list by the user-controlled-traceability experiment). It follows
that for the revocation list RL = {sk1, . . . , sk j−1, sk j+1, . . . , sk t} we have that
VerifyDAA(pk I ,mj , dom, σj , RL) = 1. Thus, since we know that all signatures in
OUT are not an output of the CreateComment oracle and there exists at least
one valid signature despite using a revocation list with the secret keys of all cor-
rupted users by returning (U , σj ,mj , dom) for some U of a signer, the reduction
wins the user-controlled-traceability experiment. The U is chosen depending on
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the type of forgery. If sk j does not correspond to a secret key of any honest user
(the reduction can check this asking its oracle for a signature under a dummy
message for all honest users in basename dom and comparing the corresponding
pseudonym with nymj) U is chosen as an identifier of a corrupted user and
otherwise as the identifier of the honest user with secret key sk j .
Thus, we have
Pr[ExptrollA 1
λ) = 1] = 3 · (Adv[RtraceDAA ] + Adv[Rcollisionh ]+
+ Adv[RVerifyBsnDAA ]) + Adv[RE1Π ]
≤ negl(λ) .
G.3 Non-frameability
Definition 17. We say that the system is non-frameable if for every adversary
A, every 1λ, the probability Pr[ExpnoframeA (1λ) = 1] is negligible 1λ.
Experiment ExpnoframeA (1
λ):
CU← ∅; HU← ∅; V ← ∅;
USK← ∅; COMM← ∅; ver← ∅;
(sk I, pk I)←$ Setup(1λ)
O = {CorruptUser(·),CreateHonestUser(·, ver, sk I),
CorruptVer(·, ver),CreateComment(·, ·, ·, pk I), JoinSystem(·, ver, sk I)}
(nym∗, dom∗,m∗γ∗)←$ AO(ρ, pk I)
Return 0 if Verify(pk I,nym
∗, dom∗,m∗, γ∗) = 0
Return 1 if:
1) there exists no tuple (·,nym∗, dom∗,m∗, γ∗) in COMM, and
2) ∃U∗∈HU nym∗ = nymU∗ , where
(nymU∗ , ·)←$ Comment(pk I, skU∗ , credU∗ , dom∗,m∗), and
(U ∗, skU∗ , credU∗ , ·) ∈ USK
Fig. 10
Theorem 9 (Non-frameability). The TrollThrottle protocol (see Def. 3) sat-
isfies Non-frameability (see Def. 16) if the underlying DAA scheme provides
user-controlled traceability (Def. 13) and is instantly linkable (Def. 5), the hash
function h is collision-resistant and the proof system for relation RJoin is a proof
of knowledge.
Proof. Assume there exists a PPT adversaryA that can win the non-frameability
game with non-negligible probability. Then by instant linkability there ∃dom,U ∈
HU,nym = NymGen(skU , dom), s.t. Verify(pk I,nym, dom,m, γ) = 1 and ¬∃(·,nym,
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dom,m, γ) ∈ COMM. In other words, the adversary is able to create a valid
γ = (σ,nym, dom,m) tuple that corresponds to an honest user U ∈ HU. We
first exclude the case that the adversary wins by using a comment from COMM
under a different message m′. It is easy to see that this basically corresponds
to an attack against the collision-resistance of the hash function and we can
use A to break the security of the hash function h. We will show that in any
adversary winning in any other can be used to create reduction R that wins the
user-controlled traceability experiment for the DAA scheme with non-negligible
probability.
R simulates the non-frameability experiment for A according to G.2. With
non-negligible probability, R obtains (nym∗, dom∗,m∗, γ∗) ←$ AO(ρ, pk I). Let
out = (U ∗, σ∗,m∗, dom∗), where γ∗ = (σ∗,nym∗, dom∗,m∗) and U ∗ corre-
sponds to the honest user with nym∗ = NymGen(skU∗ , dom∗). According to win-
ning conditions of the non-frameability experiment we have that
VerifyDAA(pk I,DAA,m
∗, dom∗, σ∗, RL∅) will return 1 and σ∗ is not the result of
any signing query made by the reduction R. What’s more, the winning condi-
tions require that the signature corresponds to an honest user, which by instant
linkability means that σ∗ is also valid for the revocation list containing the secret
keys of all corrupted users in CU. Thus, by returning out, the reduction wins
the user-controlled-traceability experiment with a non-negligible probability. It
follows that we have
Pr[ExpnoframeA (1
λ) = 1] =Adv[RtraceDAA ] + Adv[Rcollisionh ]+
Adv[RE1Π ] ≤ negl(λ) .
G.4 Anonymity
Definition 18. We say that the system is anonymous if for every adversary A,
every 1λ, the probability Pr[ExpanonA (1
λ) = 1] = 12 + negl(λ).
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Experiment ExpanonA (1
λ):
CU← ∅; HU← ∅; V ← ∅;
USK← ∅; COMM← ∅; ver← ∅;
(sk I, pk I)←$ Setup(1λ)
O = {CorruptUser(·),CreateHonestUser(·, ver, sk I),
HJoinSystem(·, ver, pk I, V ),CreateComment(·, ·, ·, pk I)}
(U ∗, dom∗,m∗)←$ AO(ρ, sk I)
b←$ {0, 1}
chall = Challb(U
∗, dom∗,m∗, sk I, pk I)
O2 = {CorruptUser(·),CreateHonestUser(·, ver, sk I),
HJoinSystem(·, ver, pk I, V ),CreateComment(·, ·, ·, pk I)}
b∗ ←$ AO2(ρ, sk I, chall)
Return 0 if (U ∗, ·, dom∗, ·, ·) ∈ COMM
Return 1 iff b = b∗ and U ∗ ∈ HU
Fig. 11
Theorem 10 (Anonymity). The TrollThrottle protocol (see Def. 3) satisfies
Anonymity (see Def. 18), if the underlying DAA scheme provides user-controlled
anonymity (Def. 12) and the proof system for relation RJoin is a proof of knowl-
edge.
Proof. Assume there exists a PPT adversary A that can break the anonymity
game with probability 12 + ε(λ) where  is non-negligible in λ. We construct a
PPT adversary R against the user-controlled-anonymity game that wins with
the same probability as A.We construct R as follows:
1. Experiment simulation for A:
– The oracles CorruptUser(·),CreateHonestUser(·, ver, sk I),
CreateComment(·, ·, ·, pk I) are simulated according to G.2.
– To answer queries to the HJoinSystem oracle, the reduction uses its own
IHJoin(S) oracle and the simulator Sim to generate the proof for relation
RJoin (here we require the zero-knowledge property).
– The oracle Challb(U , dom,m, sk I, pk I) is simulated as follows:
• R chooses some U ′ 6= U and (U ′, ·, ·, ·) 6∈ USK uniformly at random.
• R queries it’s Join oracle on U ′ obtaining credU ′ .
• R gives S0 = U and S1 = U ′ , m and dom to its challenger and
receives the challenge σ′b = SignDAA(skSb , credSb ,m, dom).
• R sends (NymExtract(σ′b), (σ′b,NymExtract(σ′b), dom,m)) to A. If the
challenged bit is 0, the simulation of R is equivalent to Chall0(·).
Otherwise, it the challenged bit is 1, the simulation is equivalent to
Chall1(·).
– With non-negligible probability, R obtains bA ←$ AO(ρ, sk I).
2. R returns out = bA and wins the user-controlled anonymity experiment if A
wins against it’s anonymity game.
50 Esiyok I., Hanzlik L., Ku¨nnemann R., Budde L.M and Backes M.
Thus, by user-controlled anonymity of the DAA scheme and the zero-knowledge
of the proof system we have Pr[ExpanonA (1
λ) = 1] = 12 +Adv[RanonDAA ]+Adv[RZKΠ ].
G.5 Accountability
The system shall provide accountability against censorship by allowing a partici-
pant to claim and prove that a website censored its comment. The party provides
evidence that can be used to prove that an entry in the public ledger belongs
to a certain message and basename. Deciding when a message is acceptable is a
matter of public opinion and not modelled here.
Soundness
Definition 19. We say that the system’s accountability mechanism is sound if
for every adversary A and 1λ, the probability Pr[ExpaccsoundA (1λ) = 1] is negligible
1λ.
Experiment ExpaccsoundA (1
λ):
CU← ∅; HU← ∅; VM← ∅;
USK← ∅; COMM← ∅; ver← ∅;
(sk I, pk I)←$ Setup(1λ)
O = {CorruptUser(·),CreateHonestUser(·, ver, sk I),
CorruptVer(·, ver),CreateComment(·, ·, ·, pk I), JoinSystem(·, ver, sk I)}
(dom∗,m∗, γ∗, evidence∗)←$ AO(ρ, pk I)
Return 1 if all of the following hold true
– COMM contains no tuple (·, dom∗,m∗, ·)
– COMM contains a tuple (·, ·, ·, ·, γ∗)
– VerifyClaim(pk I, dom
∗,m∗, γ∗, evidence∗) = 1
Fig. 12
Theorem 11 (Sound accountability). The TrollThrottle protocol (see Def. 3)
has a sound accountability mechanism (see Def. 19) if h is collision resistant.
Proof. Assume there exists a PPT adversary A that can win the sound ac-
countability game with non-negligible probability. For the case where the ex-
periment returns 1, the adversary returns (dom∗,m∗, γ∗, evidence∗) such that,
(·, ·, dom∗,m∗, ·) 6∈ COMM, but, for some U ′, nym ′, dom ′ andm′, (U ′,nym ′, dom ′,m′, γ∗) ∈
COMM, and (by definition of VerifyClaim), γ∗ = (σ∗,nym∗, h(m∗), dom∗) for
some σ∗ and nym∗, as well as Verify(pk I,nym
∗, dom∗,m∗, γ∗) = 1. By defini-
tion of CreateComment, (nym ′, γ∗)←$ Comment(pk I, skU ′ , credU ′ , dom ′,m′), and
thus by definition of Comment, γ∗ = (σ′,nym ′, h(m′), dom ′) = (σ∗,nym∗, h(m∗), dom∗).
TrollThrottle — Raising the Cost of Astroturfing 51
Hence, (U ′,nym∗, dom∗,m′, γ∗) ∈ COMM. As we assume h to be collision-
resistant, m′ 6= m while h(m′) = h(m) would constitute an attack. Hence, if
A′ does not find a collision this way, then (U ′,nym∗, dom∗,m∗, γ∗) ∈ COMM,
contradicting the assumption that no such tuple is in COMM.
Completeness
Definition 20. We say that the system’s accountability mechanism is complete
if for every adversary A, every 1λ, the probability Pr[ExpacccomplA (1λ) = 1] is
negligible 1λ.
Experiment ExpacccomplA (1
λ):
CU← ∅; HU← ∅; V ← ∅;
USK← ∅; COMM← ∅; ver← ∅;
(sk I, pk I)←$ Setup(1λ)
O = {CorruptUser(·),CreateHonestUser(·, ver, sk I),
CorruptVer(·, ver),CreateComment(·, ·, ·, pk I), JoinSystem(·, ver, sk I)}
(U ∗,nym∗, dom∗,m∗, γ∗, evidence∗)←$ AO(ρ, pk I)
Return 1 if there exist tuples (U ∗,nym∗, dom∗,m∗, γ∗) ∈ COMM,
and (U ∗, skU , credU , ·) ∈ USK such that
VerifyClaim(nym∗, dom∗i ,m
∗, γ∗, x) = 0
for x = Claim(pk I, skU , credU , dom
∗,m∗, γ∗,nym∗).
Fig. 13
Theorem 12 (Completeness of accountability mechanism). The TrollThrottle
protocol (see Def. 3) has a complete accountability mechanism (see Def. 18), if
correctness holds.
Proof. This follows immediately from the definition of CreateComment (Def. 15),
and the correctness of the DAA scheme (Def. 14).
